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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently articulated a standard to determine what claims may be barred against a purchaser of assets "free and clear" of claims pursuant to section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code and highlighted procedural due process concerns with respect to enforcement.1  The decision arose out of litigation regarding certain defects, including the well-known "ignition switch defect," affecting certain GM vehicles.  GM's successor (which acquired GM's assets in a section 363 sale in 2009) asserted that a "free and clear" provisi

Only a month ago we were singing the praises of the CVA and calling them the saviour of the high street following the creditors’ approval of the BHS CVA. (See our earlier blog Move over Mary Portas, CVA’s are the real saviour of the High Street).

On March 29, 2016, the Second Circuit addressed the breadth and application of the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions in an opinion that applied to two cases before it.  The court analyzed whether: (i) the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions preempt individual creditors' state law fraudulent conveyance claims; and (ii) the automatic stay bars creditors from asserting such claims while the trustee is actively pursuing similar claims under the Bankruptcy Code.  In In re Tribune Co.

The suitability of the collective consultation regime under the Trade Union and Labour Relation (Consolidation) Act 1992 (“TULRCA”) in an insolvency scenario has always been a hot topic amongst insolvency professionals.

One of the functions of the UK Insolvency Service is to investigate directors’ conduct and if appropriate to commence directors disqualification proceedings or enter into disqualification undertakings. As the Insolvency Service has recently reviewed in its Newsletter the type of conduct which led to the longest disqualification bans in 2014/2015, now would seem like a perfect opportunity to reflect on the lessons learned from the biggest offenders.

The District Court for the Central District of California recently held that an assignee that acquired rights to a terminated swap agreement was not a "swap participant" under the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, could not invoke safe harbors based on that status to foreclose on collateral in the face of the automatic stay. [1] The court ruled that the assignee acquired only a right to collect payment under the swap agreement, not the assignor's rights under the Bankruptcy Code to exercise remedies without first seeking court approval.

Background

On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the "Third Circuit") held that in rare instances a bankruptcy court may approve a "structured dismissal"- that is, a dismissal "that winds up the bankruptcy with certain conditions attached instead of simply dismissing the case and restoring the status quo ante" - that deviates from the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme. See Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Group/Business Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), Case No.

It has been an interesting 12 months in the world of insolvency and restructuring.

The recent English High Court decision in Horton v Henry [2014] EWHC 4209 (Ch)has conflicted with the earlier decision in Raithatha v Williamson [2012] EWCA Civ. 799 and leaves the law unclear as to whether a debtor’s pension forms part of their bankruptcy estate.

A trustee in bankruptcy’s entitlement to seek an income payments order (“IPO”) in respect of a bankrupt’s income is governed by section 310 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (the “IA”). Under section 310(7) of the IA the income of a bankrupt:

On October 31, 2014, Bankruptcy Judge Kaplan of the District of New Jersey addressed two issues critically important to intellectual property licensees and purchasers: (i) can a trademark  licensee use section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code to keep licensed marks following a  debtor-licensor’s rejection of a license agreement?; and (ii) can a “free and clear” sale of  intellectual property eliminate any rights retained by a licensee? In re Crumbs Bake Shop, Inc., et  al., 2014 WL 5508177 (Bankr. D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2014).