In bankruptcy cases under chapter 11, debtors sometimes opt for a "structured dismissal" when a consensual plan of reorganization or liquidation cannot be reached or conversion to chapter 7 would be too costly. In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 2017 BL 89680 (U.S. Mar. 27, 2017), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow bankruptcy courts to approve distributions in structured dismissals which violate the Bankruptcy Code's ordinary priority rules.
On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. The Court's decision could resolve a circuit split as to whether section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code can shield from fraudulent conveyance attack transfers made through financial institutions where such financial institutions are merely "conduits" in the relevant transaction.
On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. See FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP, 830 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2016) (a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's ruling is available here).
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on March 22, 2017, in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., that without the consent of affected creditors, bankruptcy courts may not approve "structured dismissals" providing for distributions that "deviate from the basic priority rules that apply under the primary mechanisms the [Bankruptcy] Code establishes for final distributions of estate value in business bankruptcies."
The recent successful appeal in Brooks and another (Joint Liquidators of Robin Hood Centre plc in liquidation) v Armstrong and another [2016] EWHC 2893 (Ch), [2016] All ER (D) 117 (Nov) has clarified and highlighted the complexities of bringing a wrongful trading claim and the importance of correctly quantifying losses for which directors can be made personally liable under section 214 and/or 246Z of the Insolvency Act 1986 (“the Act”).
The High Court has recently demonstrated its right to exercise discretion as to whether an administration order should be made in relation to a company. In Rowntree Ventures v Oak Property Partners Limited, even though the companies were unable to pay their debts and where the statutory purpose of administration was likely to be achieved, the Court exercised its commercial judgment in determining that it was premature to make an administration order.
Background
Unless you have been hiding in an igloo in Antarctica for the last year you could not possibly have missed the media furore over the huge pension liabilities of eminent companies that have become insolvent. BHS, a venerable British retailer, is the most high profile after recently entering administration with an estimated pensions deficit of £571m.
The interest rate mis-selling scandal took another twist recently when a landmark legal case was dismissed by the High Court. Had the case been successful it would have challenged the banks’ £2.1bn compensation scheme set-up to settle inappropriate interest rate swaps – however the decision only brings temporary relief for the banks.
Background
During the previous UK government’s tenure, in March 2015 a call for evidence was launched to understand better the employee consultation process when an employer faces insolvency, restructure or other form of company rescue (Call for Evidence on Collective Redundancy Consultation for Employers facing Insolvency).
The call for evidence sought views on the following areas:
Further to the review of pre-pack administration sales (“pre-packs”) by Teresa Graham CBE last year (the findings of which were published in the “Graham Report” and discussed in one of our earlier blogs,Change in Sight for UK Pre-pack Administration Regulation), the key recommendations have now been implemented in order to improve fairness and transparency especially where a pre-pack sale occurs to a connected party.