The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code – a provision which, in effect, prohibits confirmation of a plan unless the plan has been accepted by at least one impaired class of claims – applies on “per plan” rather than a “per debtor” basis, even when the plan at issue covers multiple debtors. In re Transwest Resort Properties, Inc., 2018 WL 615431 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2018). The Court is the first circuit court to address the issue.
You have been reading for months that the U.S. Supreme Court approved amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the “Bankruptcy Rules”) that go into effect on December 1, 2017. You also may have ignored these changes because they affect Chapter 13 consumer cases and may not impact your commercial bankruptcy practice.
Right?
In a move that surprised bankruptcy practitioners and other observers, a Delaware bankruptcy court recently rescinded an order approving a $275 million break-up fee relating to a failed merger.
Some six years after the United States Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall, courts continue to grapple with the decision’s meaning and how much it curtails the exercise of bankruptcy court jurisdiction.[1] The U.S.
Earlier this month, the United States Supreme Court agreed to review a Seventh Circuit decision regarding the scope of the so-called “safe harbor” from avoidable transfers provided in Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code. Many in the U.S. bankruptcy industry expect that the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., Case No. 16-784, in order to resolve a long-running split among the 2nd, 3rd, 6th, 8th, and 10th Circuits, on the one hand, and the 7th and 11th Circuits on the other.
On March 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts cannot approve a “structured dismissal”—a dismissal with special conditions or that does something other than restoring the “prepetition financial status quo”—providing for distributions that deviate from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme absent the consent of affected creditors. Czyzewski v.Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 580 U.S. ___ (2017), 2017 WL 1066259, at *3 (Mar. 22, 2017).
Recently, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that a carve-out provision in a DIP financing order did not act as an absolute limit on the fees and expenses payable to the professionals retained by an unsecured creditors’ committee (the “Committee”). Rather, in In re Molycorp, Inc., 562 B.R. 67 (Bankr. D. Del.
When we last discussed the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico’s efforts to restructure some $72 billion in municipal debt, a Federal District Court Judge had found the Commonwealth’s 2014 municipal debt-restructuring law, the “Recovery Act,” to be pre-empted by the federal Bankruptcy Code, unconstitutional and therefore void.
Recently, lawyers for 50 Cent fought against the appointment of a bankruptcy examiner to investigate Instagram photos the rapper posted of himself lying next to piles of hundred dollar bills. In one picture, the bills spelled out the word “BROKE.” The humor of the photos was lost on the Office of the U.S. Trustee, who viewed the postings as disrespectful of the bankruptcy process and possible evidence that 50 Cent committed bankruptcy fraud by concealing assets from his creditors.
On March 29, 2016, the Second Circuit addressed the breadth and application of the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions in an opinion that applied to two cases before it. The court analyzed whether: (i) the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions preempt individual creditors' state law fraudulent conveyance claims; and (ii) the automatic stay bars creditors from asserting such claims while the trustee is actively pursuing similar claims under the Bankruptcy Code. In In re Tribune Co.