In a move that surprised bankruptcy practitioners and other observers, a Delaware bankruptcy court recently rescinded an order approving a $275 million break-up fee relating to a failed merger.

The Court of Appeal has helpfully confirmed that a judgment creditor can seek an order appointing a receiver by way of equitable execution where:

• the debtor holds a legal or equitable interest in property; and
• execution against the property is not available at law by one of the usual methods, for instance via the sheriff or by a garnishee order.

There was previously doubt as to whether such a receiver could be appointed where the debtor held a legal, as opposed to an equitable interest, in property.

Earlier this month, the United States Supreme Court agreed to review a Seventh Circuit decision regarding the scope of the so-called “safe harbor” from avoidable transfers provided in Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code. Many in the U.S. bankruptcy industry expect that the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., Case No. 16-784, in order to resolve a long-running split among the 2nd, 3rd, 6th, 8th, and 10th Circuits, on the one hand, and the 7th and 11th Circuits on the other.

The High Court has recently expressed concern that distressed borrowers are being duped into paying money to the anonymous promoters of schemes, which purport to protect them from enforcement by lenders but are actually ‘utterly misguided and spurious’.

There are a number of schemes being promoted at the moment that supposedly protect borrowers in arrears from enforcement by their lender.

Recently, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that a carve-out provision in a DIP financing order did not act as an absolute limit on the fees and expenses payable to the professionals retained by an unsecured creditors’ committee (the “Committee”). Rather, in In re Molycorp, Inc., 562 B.R. 67 (Bankr. D. Del.

Simple retention of title clauses are commonplace and generally effective in contracts for the sale of goods. However, extending their effect to the proceeds of sale of such goods requires careful drafting.

The Court of Appeal has provided some further clarity around the creation and effects of fiduciary obligations in relation to such clauses.[1]

Proceeds of sale clauses

When we last discussed the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico’s efforts to restructure some $72 billion in municipal debt, a Federal District Court Judge had found the Commonwealth’s 2014 municipal debt-restructuring law, the “Recovery Act,” to be pre-empted by the federal Bankruptcy Code, unconstitutional and therefore void.

The High Court has reiterated that cross-examination will not generally be permitted on an interlocutory application, or where there is no conflict of fact on the affidavits.

In McCarthy v Murphy,^[1] the defendant mortgagor was not permitted to cross-examine the plaintiff (a receiver) or a bank employee who swore a supporting affidavit.

Background

Two recent judgments have brought further clarity in relation to the rights acquirers of loan portfolios to enforce against borrowers:

In AIB Mortgage Bank -v- O'Toole & anor [2016] IEHC 368 the High Court determined that a bank was not prevented from relying on a mortgage as security for all sums due by the defendants, despite issuing a redemption statement which omitted this fact.

In order to understand this case, it is necessary to set out the chronology of events: