When it comes to voting on a plan, Section 1126(e) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a bankruptcy court may designate (or disallow) the votes of any entity whose vote to accept or reject was not made in “good faith” (a term that is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code).

Each year, millions of parents across America write checks to institutions of higher learning, in payment of tuition and charges for their children to pursue a college degree. Inevitably, some of those parents end up in the bankruptcy courts. In recent years, trustees have found an attractive potential source of estate recovery: pursuing the colleges and universities to recover tuition and related payments as constructive fraudulent transfers.

Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code shields certain transfers involving settlement payments and other payments in connection with securities contracts (for example, payment for stock) made to certain financial intermediaries, such as banks, from avoidance as a fraudulent conveyance or preferential transfer. In recent years, several circuit courts interpreted 546(e) as applying to a transfer that flows through a financial intermediary, even if the ultimate recipient of the transfer would not qualify for the protection of 546(e).

One of the fundamental elements of the American bankruptcy system is the automatic stay under section 362 of the bankruptcy code. The stay protects the debtor and its assets from creditor activity, in order to facilitate equitable treatment of creditors in the collective bankruptcy process. The remedies provided for violations of the stay allow the estate to enforce the protections provided by section 362.

A recent decision by Bankruptcy Judge Stuart Bernstein, made in connection with plan confirmation in the SunEdison bankruptcy case, strikes down non-consensual third-party releases on a variety of bases. The decision analyzes issues regarding subject matter jurisdiction, the circumstances of deemed consent, and the applicable substantive requirements for a non-consensual release.

On October 20, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a decision which, among other things,[1] affirmed the lower courts’ holding that certain noteholders were not entitled to payment of a make-whole premium. The Second Circuit held that the make-whole premium only was due in the case of an optional redemption, and not in the case of an acceleration brought about by a bankruptcy filing.

On October 20, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued an important decision regarding the manner in which interest must be calculated to satisfy the cramdown requirements in a chapter 11 case.[1] The Second Circuit sided with Momentive’s senior noteholders and found that “take back” paper issued pursuant to a chapter 11 plan should bear a market rate of interest when the market rate can be ascerta

On October 3, 2017, Bankruptcy Judge Laurie Selber Silverstein of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued a decision holding that the Bankruptcy Court had constitutional authority to approve third-party releases in a final order confirming a plan of reorganization.

For decades, restructuring and insolvency matters in the Dominican Republic involving merchants and companies in non-regulated industries have been carried out on a “de facto” basis, due to the obsolescence of the existing legal framework and institutions. Fortunately, that is not the case anymore.

A recent decision by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals may have muddied the question of the impact of collateral rent assignments on a debtor’s ability to re-organize under chapter 11.