The bankruptcy courts have a long history of being willing to use their judicial power under the Bankruptcy Code to prevent perceived efforts by debtors to inappropriately shield their assets from creditors. This is true even when the debtors employ structures and devices that are complex and crafted in seeming compliance with applicable law.

It is relatively rare when a Circuit Court issues an opinion on the preference defenses under section 547(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. It is even more unusual when a decision examines the fact-focused “ordinary course” defense under section 547(c)(2). The ordinary course defense shields payments determined to have been made in the “ordinary course of business” of both the debtor and the creditor.

Delaware has long established itself as a welcoming jurisdiction for various legal purposes. It began as a center for company incorporation by providing a corporate law framework that was flexible and continuously updated for new developments. More recently, Delaware has applied those same principles (plus an expansive view of venue) to become a center for major chapter 11 reorganization filings.

The courts have long struggled with the question of whether particular orders entered by a bankruptcy court are final, and therefore appealable as a matter of right. It is generally recognized that a bankruptcy case is distinctly different from the usual civil case in that it is a framework within which a variety of disputes arise and are resolved. That distinction is recognized in 28 U.S.C. §158(d)(1), which provides that appeals as of right maybe taken not only from final judgments in cases but from “final judgments, orders, and decrees…in cases and proceedings….”

In Shlosberg v Avonwick Holdings Ltd [2016] EWHC 1001 (Ch), Mr Shloesberg applied for an order restraining Dechert (a firm of solicitors) from acting for Avonwick (the first respondent) and Mr Shloesberg's Trustees in bankruptcy (the third respondents). 

Following the determination of the substantive High Court case earlier last year (see our previous summary here), this case concerned a dispute in respect of a right to claim int

In Cook v Mortgage Debenture, Mr Cook applied to be joined to a proceeding that was being continued by a claimant company after it had been placed into administration.  The issue was whether the Court's consent was required on the basis that the application was against a company in administration (the English legislation being similar to section 248 of the Companies Act 1993).  The Court concluded that, while the moratorium covered legal proceedings against a company in administration or liquidation, it does not cover defensive steps in proceedings brought (or contin

In Madsen-Ries and Vance v Petera the High Court found that the directors of Petranz Limited (in liquidation) had breached certain directors' duties under the Companies Act and, as a consequence, were liable to pay compensation to the Company.  In particular, the directors failed to keep proper financial records and produce financial statements.

The decision of Graham & Jackson v Arena Capital Limited (In Liquidation) concerned an application under the Companies Act 1993 by liquidators seeking direction on the application of liquidation funds.

A recent interlocutory decision (Action Media Ltd v Mitchell [2015] NZHC 3121) in ongoing litigation between the liquidators and the former director and shareholder of Action Media Ltd (In Liquidation) gives some guidance on the relationship between the liquidators' powers under section 261 of the Companies Act 1993 and their obligations to discover relevant documents under their control.  The defendants had requested discovery from the liquidators of certain correspondence between the liquidators and the IRD, and of pre-liquidation correspondence between the company and