In Stojkov v Kamal [2015] NZHC 2513 a creditor, Mr Stokjov, gave notice to the appointed liquidator, Mr Kamal, for a meeting of creditors to be called. Mr Kamal did not call the meeting and maintained that the notice was given out of time. Mr Stokjov reasonably pointed out that this was plainly incorrect. Mr Kamal, despite clearly being in breach of his duty, still refused to call the meeting and later claimed (quite irrelevantly) that the cost of the meeting was not justified.
Sanson v Ebert Construction Limited [2015] NZHC 2402 concerned the successful application by liquidators to set aside payments made pursuant to a direct deed arrangement, as they were payments made on behalf of the insolvent developer. Sanson was the first New Zealand case where a liquidator has raised this argument but it is unlikely to be the last. Direct deeds are a common contractual tool in construction projects to give financiers the right to step into the place of the developer and directly arrange for payments to the contractor to ensure that t
In King v PFL Finance Limited & Anor [2015] NZCA 517, the Kings, a husband and wife team of farmers, arranged finance from PFL Finance Limited but the loan went into default. PFL served PLA notices but failed to serve the Kings as guarantors. A receiver was appointed to the farming operation, who determined to cease trading the day after his appointment.
In Purewal v Countrywide Residential Lettings Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 1122, the receivers of a property did not make an insurance claim in relation to damage to the property. The mortgagor of the property (a bankrupt) repaired the property himself. He brought an action against the receivers for breach of duty by failing to make an insurance claim, claiming damages for the cost of the repairs.
The General Motors chapter 11 case continues to produce interesting decisions on a variety of bankruptcy issues. Most recently, the bankruptcy court issued an opinion on the liability of “New GM” for alleged ignition switch defects, many of which involve vehicles manufactured by “Old GM” prior to the bankruptcy filing.
When the Supreme Court issued its decision in Baker & Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC in June, it caused something of a flutter in the bankruptcy community. The decision held that a professional could not recover for the fees it incurred in defending against objections to its fee application.
Last month, the Supreme Court announced its decision in Baker Botts LLP v. Asarco LLC. As most readers will be aware, that case involved a dispute over whether debtor’s retained counsel could be compensated for the fees and expenses incurred in the defense of its bankruptcy fee application.
People are generally familiar with the concept that a party’s right to appeal applies to those orders that are “final.” A “final” order is one that resolves or disposes of the disputes between the parties. While an interlocutory order may be appealable at the discretion of the appellate court, the aggrieved party has no absolute right to appeal an order that is not “final.”
Most bankruptcy lawyers are familiar with section 1111(b) and its attempt to rectify a perceived unfairness resulting from the ruling in In re Pine Gate Assocs., Ltd., Case No. B75-4345A, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17366 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 14, 1976). In Pinegate, the creditor’s collateral had depreciated as the result of a cyclical market fluctuation.
What began as a garden variety bankruptcy claims objection has ended with a sharply-worded, sixty-page opinion, in which the Sixth Circuit’s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel ( “BAP”) affirmed a bankruptcy court’s $200,000 sanctions order entered against the creditor’s attorney.