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Last month, the Supreme Court announced its decision in Baker Botts LLP v. Asarco LLC. As most readers will be aware, that case involved a dispute over whether debtor’s retained counsel could be compensated for the fees and expenses incurred in the defense of its bankruptcy fee application.

If a director can exercise a right of set-off against a company in liquidation for a debt owed to the director or for a liability of the company to the director (which may be unascertained in amount or contingent), it may help to cancel out or significantly reduce the director’s liability to the company for insolvent trading.

People are generally familiar with the concept that a party’s right to appeal applies to those orders that are “final.” A “final” order is one that resolves or disposes of the disputes between the parties. While an interlocutory order may be appealable at the discretion of the appellate court, the aggrieved party has no absolute right to appeal an order that is not “final.”

Most bankruptcy lawyers are familiar with section 1111(b) and its attempt to rectify a perceived unfairness resulting from the ruling in In re Pine Gate Assocs., Ltd., Case No. B75-4345A, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17366 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 14, 1976). In Pinegate, the creditor’s collateral had depreciated as the result of a cyclical market fluctuation.

In Allco Funds Management Limited v Trust Co (Re Services) Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1251, an inter-company loan transaction was challenged by a receiver appointed by the secured creditor to one of the companies. Common directors were involved in the transaction. The issue was whether the directors breached their fiduciary duties entitling the company via the receiver to have the transaction set aside.

The background to the case

A debtor company can seek to have a statutory demand set aside if there is a genuine dispute as to the existence or amount of the debt, or the company has an offsetting claim.

Because the threshold for contesting a statutory demand is relatively low, a creditor may decide it is better to issue the statutory demand for the undisputed portion of the total debt after making an appropriate allowance for the amount of the total debt in dispute or the amount of the alleged offsetting claim.

What began as a garden variety bankruptcy claims objection has ended with a sharply-worded, sixty-page opinion, in which the Sixth Circuit’s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel ( “BAP”) affirmed a bankruptcy court’s $200,000 sanctions order entered against the creditor’s attorney.

When a company is facing short term financial difficulties the directors or shareholders may decide to make a loan to the company to pay wages. 

“Bad news comes in threes.” “Third time’s the charm.” “Three strikes and you’re out.”

One of these three adages may come to characterize the outcome of a case of significant import argued before the US Supreme Court this week. The Supreme Court heard arguments on Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif. The case is the third in a trilogy including Stern v. Marshall and Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, which examine the scope of the constitutional exercise of judicial power by bankruptcy courts.

Under section 365(f)(1), a debtor is permitted to assume and assign leases and executory contracts notwithstanding contractual limitations or “applicable law” that restricts such assignment. However, that broad general authorization begins with the limiting language, “except as provided in subsection (b) and (c) of this section….”