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Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.

In my most recent blog post, I provided some tips for creditors who find themselves in the Subchapter V arena. This is somewhat of a follow-up to that one.

Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.

The overwhelming majority of my practice has involved larger, complex Chapter 11 cases and out-of-court restructurings, and representing debtors, Chapter 11 trustees, committees or creditors.

When Subchapter V came to be in 2019 under the Small Business Reorganization Act, I honestly did not think that I would have the opportunity to participate in those types of cases due to the debt limitations imposed by statute.

The overwhelming majority of my practice has involved larger, complex Chapter 11 cases and out-of-court restructurings, representing debtors, Chapter 11 trustees, committees, or creditors. However, with the expansion during Covid of the Subchapter V debt limit to $7.5 million, I have found myself participating in multiple Subchapter V cases as counsel to creditors. I discovered quickly that habits developed in larger Chapter 11 cases do not necessarily translate to Subchapter V.

Federal appellate courts have traditionally applied a "person aggrieved" standard to determine whether a party has standing to appeal a bankruptcy court order or judgment. However, this standard, which requires a direct, adverse, and financial impact on a potential appellant, is derived from a precursor to the Bankruptcy Code and does not appear in the existing statute.

The court-fashioned doctrine of "equitable mootness" has frequently been applied to bar appeals of bankruptcy court orders under circumstances where reversal or modification of an order could jeopardize, for example, the implementation of a negotiated chapter 11 plan or related agreements and upset the expectations of third parties who have relied on the order.

On June 6, 2023, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas confirmed the chapter 11 plan of bedding manufacturer Serta Simmons Bedding, LLC and its affiliates (collectively, "Serta"). In confirming Serta's plan, the court held that a 2020 "uptier," or "position enhancement," transaction (the "2020 Transaction") whereby Serta issued new debt secured by a priming lien on its assets and purchased its existing debt from participating lenders at a discount with a portion of the proceeds did not violate the terms of Serta's 2016 credit agreement.

Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code's "safe harbor" preventing avoidance in bankruptcy of certain securities, commodity, or forward-contract payments has long been a magnet for controversy. Several noteworthy court rulings have been issued in bankruptcy cases addressing the application of the provision, including application to financial institutions, its preemptive scope, and its application to non-publicly traded securities.

Bankruptcy trustees and chapter 11 debtors-in-possession ("DIPs") frequently seek to avoid fraudulent transfers and obligations under section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and state fraudulent transfer or other applicable nonbankruptcy laws because the statutory "look-back" period for avoidance under many nonbankruptcy laws exceeds the two-year period governing avoidance actions under section 548.