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The Alberta Court of Appeal has dismissed the appeal brought by the Alberta Energy Regulator and the Orphan Well Association from the decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta in Re Redwater Energy Corporation. A majority of the panel held that the provisions of the provincial legislation governing certain actions of licensees of oil and gas assets do not apply to receivers and trustees in bankruptcy of insolvent companies, given the paramountcy of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act over provincial legislation where the governing provisions conflict.

We have written in the past about the doctrine of equitable mootness. A March 30, 2017 per curiam affirmance by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Beem v. Ferguson (In re Ferguson) explores the concept and limitations of equitable mootness and distinguishes it from the related doctrine of constitutional mootness.

When a lender makes an interest bearing loan to a borrower for a fixed term, the contract may provide that the borrower cannot repay the principal sum before maturity. This is often referred to as a “no call” provision. The intent of this provision is to protect the lender’s expected return on its investment during the term of the contract. Otherwise, the lender could be faced with the loss of interest payments that the borrower would have otherwise paid to the lender.

What can a lender do about successive bankruptcy filings by a borrower? What can lessors do when their tenants file successive bankruptcy petitions? A recent decision by a bankruptcy court in the Eastern District of New York gives guidance on these questions.

In a prior post, we discussed the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Jevic Holding Corp., where the court upheld the use of so-called “structured dismissals” in bankruptcy cases, and the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari. Yesterday, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Jevic. The Court’s ultimate ruling will likely have a significant impact upon bankruptcy practice.

What does it mean to “cure” a default in the context of a plan of reorganization? This question arises by virtue of section 1123(a)(5)(G) of the Bankruptcy Code, which requires that a plan provide adequate means for the plan’s implementation, including the “curing or waiving of any default.” On November 4, 2016, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals defined what it means to “cure” by holding that a debtor can only cure a contractual default under a plan of reorganization by complying with contractual post-default interest rate provisions.

When should debt be recharacterized as equity? The answer to this question will have an enormous impact upon expected recovery in bankruptcy since equity does not begin to get paid until all prior classes of claims are paid in full. In a recent unpublished opinion, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals provided some guidance on when and in what circumstances recharacterization is appropriate. The Court’s decision also serves as warning to purchasers of debt that they may not be able to hide behind the original debt transaction in a recharacterization fight.

The Jevic Holding Corp. bankruptcy case is proving to be precedent setting.  In a prior post, we examined how the court had greatly increased the evidentiary burden on a party seeking to hold one company liable for the debts of another company under a “single employer” theory.  That ruling was seen as a boon for private equity firms who were oftentimes the target of Chapter 11 creditor

As discussed in our May 2016 bulletin, New Rules for Asset Sales by Insolvent Producers (at least for now), the decision of the Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta in Re Redwater Energy Corporation, 2016 ABQB 278 ("Redwater") determined that provisions of the provincial legislation governing the actions of licensees of oil and gas assets did not apply to receivers and trustees in bankruptcy of insolvent companies, given the paramountcy of the Bank

In Alberta, regulations have historically prohibited purchasers of oil and gas assets from cherry picking operating interests in economic properties while leaving behind interests in uneconomic wells. This has had a significant negative impact on the ability of a receiver or trustee to market and sell assets owned by insolvent companies and on the prices those assets are able to attract.