The Jevic Holding Corp. bankruptcy case is proving to be precedent setting. In a prior post, we examined how the court had greatly increased the evidentiary burden on a party seeking to hold one company liable for the debts of another company under a “single employer” theory. That ruling was seen as a boon for private equity firms who were oftentimes the target of Chapter 11 creditor
La sentencia del Tribunal Supremo de 8 abril 2016 realiza unas interesantes consideraciones sobre la compensación en el concurso.
- A common problem with re financing arrangements homologated (i.e., sanctioned by a court) pursuant to the 4th additional provision of the Spanish Insolvency Act (abbrev. LCon) is becoming apparent of late where the signatories to such an arrangement undertake to open or keep open lines of credit or otherwise provide the debtor with new resources and, once such arrangement has been homologated, funding needs complementary or different to those contained in the homologated refinancing arrangement arise.
- Está convirtiéndose en un problema usual en las refinanciaciones homologadas de la disposición adicional cuarta de la Ley Concursal (LCon) en las que los firmantes se comprometen a abrir o a mantener líneas de créditos o de alguna manera a facilitar al deudor recursos nuevos que, obtenida la aprobación judicial, se presenten luego necesidades previstas o imprevistas de financiación suplementaria o distinta de la plasmada en el acuerdo de refinanciación aprobado.
Con la reforma del artículo 90.1.6.º de la Ley Concursal (LCon) dispuesta por la Ley 40/2015 se generalizó un casi entusiasta clamor entre los operadores del sector. Se consideraba que quedaba definitivamente resuelto el perverso historial con- cursal de las prendas sobre créditos futuros. Yo no lo veo tan claro y puedo imaginarme más de un modo por el que un juez concursal averso a este tipo de garantías puede arruinar aquel entusiasmo por vía de una interpretación no totalmente absurda del precepto nuevo.
The amendment to art. 90(1)(6) of the Insolvency Act 22/2003 (abbrev. LCON) by the Public Sector (Legal Regime) Act 40/2015 was welcomed almost enthusiastically by most market agents. It was felt that the inconsistent treatment bestowed on pledges of future claims (hereinafter, ‘PFC’) would finally be a thing of the past. I myself am not altogether convinced that this is the case, being able to envisage more than one way an insolvency judge, averse to this type of security interests, can dampen the aforementioned enthusiasm by way of a not overly absurd interpretation of the new provision.
When can a bank be at risk of unknowingly receiving a fraudulent transfer? How much information does a bank need to have before it is on “inquiry notice”? A recent decision from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals highlights the risks that a bank takes when it ignores red flags and fails to investigate. This decision should be required reading for all lenders since, in the matter before the Seventh Circuit, the banks’ failure to investigate their borrower’s questionable activity caused the banks to lose their security and have their secured loans reduced to unsecured claims.
Did Trump win again? Yes, but this time it was not “The Donald” but was instead the casino operator Trump Entertainment Resorts, Inc.
Did Trump win again? Yes, but this time it was not “The Donald” but was instead the casino-operator Trump Entertainment Resorts, Inc. (“Trump Entertainment”).
When can a bank be at risk of unknowingly receiving a fraudulent transfer? How much information does a bank need to have before it is on “inquiry notice”? A recent decision from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals highlights the risks that a bank takes when it ignores red flags and fails to investigate.
In re Sentinel Management Group – The Decision