On November 22, Judge Stuart Bernstein of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed a series of claims brought by the bankruptcy trustee (Trustee) responsible for liquidating Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (BLMIS), which sought to claw back and recover over $4 billion in transfers made by certain nonU.S. hedge funds to their non-U.S. investors.
What does it mean to “cure” a default in the context of a plan of reorganization? This question arises by virtue of section 1123(a)(5)(G) of the Bankruptcy Code, which requires that a plan provide adequate means for the plan’s implementation, including the “curing or waiving of any default.” On November 4, 2016, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals defined what it means to “cure” by holding that a debtor can only cure a contractual default under a plan of reorganization by complying with contractual post-default interest rate provisions.
When should debt be recharacterized as equity? The answer to this question will have an enormous impact upon expected recovery in bankruptcy since equity does not begin to get paid until all prior classes of claims are paid in full. In a recent unpublished opinion, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals provided some guidance on when and in what circumstances recharacterization is appropriate. The Court’s decision also serves as warning to purchasers of debt that they may not be able to hide behind the original debt transaction in a recharacterization fight.
The Jevic Holding Corp. bankruptcy case is proving to be precedent setting. In a prior post, we examined how the court had greatly increased the evidentiary burden on a party seeking to hold one company liable for the debts of another company under a “single employer” theory. That ruling was seen as a boon for private equity firms who were oftentimes the target of Chapter 11 creditor
Court holds that distributions made pursuant to priority payment provisions contained in CDO transactions are protected by Section 560 of the Bankruptcy Code
Section 546(e) of the bankruptcy code bars state law constructive fraudulent conveyance claims asserted by creditors seeking to augment recoveries from a bankruptcy estate
Earlier today, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals issued a decision in In re Tribune Company Fraudulent Transfer Litigation, No. 13-3992-cv, holding that the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor of Section 546(e) (the Safe Harbor) prohibits clawback claims brought by creditors under state fraudulent transfer laws to the same extent that it prohibits such claims when brought by a debtor.
When can a bank be at risk of unknowingly receiving a fraudulent transfer? How much information does a bank need to have before it is on “inquiry notice”? A recent decision from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals highlights the risks that a bank takes when it ignores red flags and fails to investigate. This decision should be required reading for all lenders since, in the matter before the Seventh Circuit, the banks’ failure to investigate their borrower’s questionable activity caused the banks to lose their security and have their secured loans reduced to unsecured claims.
Did Trump win again? Yes, but this time it was not “The Donald” but was instead the casino operator Trump Entertainment Resorts, Inc.
Did Trump win again? Yes, but this time it was not “The Donald” but was instead the casino-operator Trump Entertainment Resorts, Inc. (“Trump Entertainment”).
When can a bank be at risk of unknowingly receiving a fraudulent transfer? How much information does a bank need to have before it is on “inquiry notice”? A recent decision from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals highlights the risks that a bank takes when it ignores red flags and fails to investigate.
In re Sentinel Management Group – The Decision