Certain licensees of intellectual property are expressly given expanded rights when their licensors file bankruptcy. But what about trademark licensees? Trademarks are not among the defined categories of “intellectual property” for bankruptcy purposes. Nonetheless, are trademark licensees otherwise protected in a licensor bankruptcy? Unfortunately for these licensees, a recent circuit court decision put the brakes on attempts to expand protection to licensees of trademarks.

In a prior post, we examined whether state-licensed marijuana businesses, and those doing business with marijuana businesses, can seek relief under the Bankruptcy Code.

As more and more states pass laws allowing the sale of marijuana, whether for medicinal or recreational purposes, investors will try to claim their share of what is certainly going to be a lucrative market. However, even in a growing market, private enterprises fail or need restructuring. This raises the question of whether distressed marijuana businesses, and those doing business with marijuana businesses, can seek relief under the Bankruptcy Code.

In Clark’s Crystal Springs Ranch, LLC v. Gugino (In re Clark), 692 Fed. Appx. 946, 2017 BL 240043 (9th Cir. July 12, 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that: (i) the remedy of "substantive consolidation" is governed by federal bankruptcy law, not state law; and (ii) because the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly forbid the substantive consolidation of debtors and nondebtors, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188 (2014), does not bar bankruptcy courts from ordering the remedy.

Last Friday, October 13, Judge Sean H. Lane of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued an opinion addressing the presumption against extraterritoriality of US law as well as the limits of the doctrine of international comity.

For decades, restructuring and insolvency matters in the Dominican Republic involving merchants and companies in non-regulated industries have been carried out on a “de facto” basis, due to the obsolescence of the existing legal framework and institutions. Fortunately, that is not the case anymore.

Late last month, the Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari review of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in PEM Entities LLC v. Eric M. Levin & Howard Shareff. At issue in PEM Entities is whether a debt claim held by existing equity investors should be recharacterized as equity. The Supreme Court is now poised to resolve a split among the federal circuits concerning whether federal or state law should govern debt recharacterization claims.

With its landmark ruling in Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. v. Large Private Beneficial Owners (In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig.), 818 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2016) ("Tribune 1"), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that claims asserted by creditors of the Tribune Co. ("Tribune") seeking to avoid payments to shareholders during a 2007 leveraged buyout ("LBO") as constructive fraudulent transfers were preempted by the "safe harbor" under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code.

We have written in the past about the doctrine of equitable mootness. A March 30, 2017 per curiam affirmance by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Beem v. Ferguson (In re Ferguson) explores the concept and limitations of equitable mootness and distinguishes it from the related doctrine of constitutional mootness.

What can a lender do about successive bankruptcy filings by a borrower? What can lessors do when their tenants file successive bankruptcy petitions? A recent decision by a bankruptcy court in the Eastern District of New York gives guidance on these questions.