On 6 April 2017, the Insolvency Rules 2016 came into force. The new rules aim to modernise the insolvency process; and make it more efficient. Physical meetings, as the default decision making process, have been abolished. Where the debtor ‘customarily’ communicated with a creditor by way of email notices can be served by email under deemed consent, rather than through the post. The rules also introduce the use of websites to publish notices, without the need to inform creditors of any postings.
When someone is made bankrupt, all property owned by them, at the date of bankruptcy, forms part of the bankruptcy estate. Property not only includes physical assets, such as goods, land and money, but also intangible assets, such as a cash balance with a bank, debts, benefits under contracts, legacies and causes of action. These assets are known as ‘things in action’. The bankruptcy estate vests in a trustee in bankruptcy upon appointment.
We have written in the past about the doctrine of equitable mootness. A March 30, 2017 per curiam affirmance by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Beem v. Ferguson (In re Ferguson) explores the concept and limitations of equitable mootness and distinguishes it from the related doctrine of constitutional mootness.
What can a lender do about successive bankruptcy filings by a borrower? What can lessors do when their tenants file successive bankruptcy petitions? A recent decision by a bankruptcy court in the Eastern District of New York gives guidance on these questions.
In a prior post, we discussed the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Jevic Holding Corp., where the court upheld the use of so-called “structured dismissals” in bankruptcy cases, and the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari. Yesterday, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Jevic. The Court’s ultimate ruling will likely have a significant impact upon bankruptcy practice.
In May 2015, I wrote an article about the conflicting lower court decisions in Raithatha –v- Williamson and Horton –v- Henry, concerning undrawn pension entitlements and income payment orders. The Court of Appeal has now finally handed down its long expected Judgment.
What does it mean to “cure” a default in the context of a plan of reorganization? This question arises by virtue of section 1123(a)(5)(G) of the Bankruptcy Code, which requires that a plan provide adequate means for the plan’s implementation, including the “curing or waiving of any default.” On November 4, 2016, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals defined what it means to “cure” by holding that a debtor can only cure a contractual default under a plan of reorganization by complying with contractual post-default interest rate provisions.
When someone is made bankrupt, their interest in the family home vests automatically in their Trustee in Bankruptcy, upon his or her appointment. The Trustee has 3 years from the date of the bankruptcy order to realise this interest. The Trustee will first of all ask if a third party is willing and able to purchase the Trustee’s share, usually 50% of the available equity. If that is not possible, then the Trustee will request that the property is put on the market for sale. As a last resort, the Trustee can apply to the Court for an order for possession and sale of the property.
Under the insolvency legislation, any dispositions of property or payments made by a company after it has been presented with a winding up petition are void, unless validated by the Court.
When should debt be recharacterized as equity? The answer to this question will have an enormous impact upon expected recovery in bankruptcy since equity does not begin to get paid until all prior classes of claims are paid in full. In a recent unpublished opinion, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals provided some guidance on when and in what circumstances recharacterization is appropriate. The Court’s decision also serves as warning to purchasers of debt that they may not be able to hide behind the original debt transaction in a recharacterization fight.