In the third (and final) of our blog series on recent CVA cases, in Rhino Enterprises Properties Ltd & Anor [2020] EWHC 2370 (Ch), the High Court gave permission for misfeasance proceedings to be brought against two former joint administrators. This was despite an approved Company Voluntary Arrangement (“CVA”) containing a clause releasing the joint administrators from liability.

Increasing pressures placed on those operating in the retail and hospitality sectors as a result of COVID-19, means there is likely to be an increasing use of CVAs in these sectors. The intention would be to help support and restructure businesses in distress, but could retailers use a CVA as a mechanism to re-write the terms of its leases?

The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated the problems faced by high-street retailers. Store closures during lockdown, changing consumer behaviour and the resultant loss of turnover and profits have caused many businesses to seek to reduce their rent payments. Company Voluntary Arrangements (“CVAs”) have become fashionable tools for trying to secure such rent reductions.

The Bankruptcy Code gives special protections to licensees of intellectual property when a debtor, as licensor, seeks to reject the license. However, the Bankruptcy Code does not include trademarks in its definition of “intellectual property.” So, are licensees of trademarks given any protection when debtors reject trademark licenses? If the Supreme Court grants a recent petition for writ of certiorari, we may get an answer.

As they say, what one hand giveth, the other hand taketh. In its recent decision in In re MPM Silicones, LLC, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed make-whole premiums and cramdown rates of interest (among other issues not addressed here), issuing rulings that will impact creditors and debtors alike.

Do a lessee’s possessory interests in real property survive a “free and clear” sale of the property under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code? In a recent decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals said “no,” holding that section 365(h) did not protect the interest of the lessee in the context of a section 363 sale when there had been no prior formal rejection of the lease under section 365.

Recently, the bankruptcy court presiding over the Energy Futures chapter 11 case issued an opinion analyzing the interplay between an intercreditor agreement’s distribution waterfall and payments to be made under the debtors’ multi-step reorganization plan. The court rejected a secured creditor’s argument that the intercreditor agreement’s distribution waterfall was triggered by one step of that reorganization.

Yesterday, the Supreme Court issued is highly awaited ruling in Czyzewski et al. v. Jevic Holding Corp. et al. The Jevic case presented the question whether bankruptcy courts may approve non-consensual structured dismissals that vary the distribution scheme established by the Bankruptcy Code.

In a recent decision in In re Packaging Systems, LLC, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey ruled that a lender that held a “super-priority” administrative expense claim under section 364(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code was still entitled to its super-priority status even after the debtor’s case converted to chapter 7.

A recent decision from the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware further puts into doubt so-called bankruptcy blocking tactics. And the opinion from In re Intervention Energy Holdings, LLC, No. 16-11247, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 2241 (Bankr. D. Del.