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The Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 (the “Act”) came into force on 26th June 2020. Alongside the Act, a new Insolvency Practice Direction (“IPD”) came into force and provides additional information in respect of winding petitions and the “coronavirus test”. This blog will look at a few of the key changes contained in the IPD.

On 20 May 2020, the UK Government introduced the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill (the “Bill”) to the House of Commons. The aim of the Bill was temporarily to amend corporate insolvency laws to give companies the best possible chance of weathering the storm of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The highly anticipated Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill (the “Bill”) was introduced to the House of Commons yesterday on 20 May 2020. Its aims appear to be simple: safeguard companies and maximise their chances of survival thereby preserving jobs.

Given the current pressure all businesses face dealing with the effect of Covid-19, it is important that directors understand what their duties are in respect of insolvent companies or companies that are at risk of heading towards insolvency.

In this blog we briefly remind directors what their duties are, the potential claims that could be brought against them in the event of insolvency and how they might arise. To mitigate against these risks it is critically important that directors:

As the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic continues to shake global markets, it is likely that more companies will need to restructure to address liquidity constraints, to right-size their balance sheets, or to implement operational restructurings. In addition to a potential surge in restructurings, the spread of COVID-19 is already having pronounced impacts on companies planning or pursuing restructurings, and further market turmoil may cause even broader changes to the restructuring marketplace.

Potential Increase in Restructuring Activity

In this three part blog we highlight three recent court decisions concerning landlord rights and insolvency, which provide cautionary warnings and surprising twists. The questions we consider are:

  1. Does a company voluntary arrangement (“CVA”) permanently vary the terms of a lease?
  2. Can a landlord be forced to accept a surrender of a lease?
  3. What are the consequences of taking money from a rent deposit if the tenant company is in administration?

In part 1 we consider the first question.

The hair salon Regis announced recently that the company has entered administration. The news might not come as a surprise because the chain, prior to the company’s administration, was subject to a company voluntary arrangement (“CVA”) whose validity was challenged by landlords.

The joint administrator of Regis commented: “trading challenges, coupled with the uncertainty caused by the legal challenge, have necessitated the need for an administration appointment”.

Can a CVA bind a landlord in respect of future rents? Is the landlord a creditor in respect of future rent? What about the right to forfeit; can a CVA modify that right? Is compromising rent under a CVA automatically unfair to landlords when other trade creditors are paid in full?

These were some of the points considered by the Court in determining whether the Debenhams’ CVA (which had been challenged by landlords) should fail.

One point of particular interest is whether reducing rents below market value in a CVA is automatically unfair to landlords?

There has been an influx of company voluntary arrangements (“CVAs”) in recent times, as retailers fight to rescue their UK high street stores. Retail CVAs accounts for the highest proportion of CVAs at 19%. As more and more CVAs are approved, we consider some of the recent trends seen in the retail sector which showcase the flexibility of a CVA and reflect the demands of landlords whose support is vital to the continuing viability of a business.

What is a CVA?

The U.S. Supreme Court held today in Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC that a trademark licensee may retain certain rights under a trademark licensing agreement even if the licensor enters bankruptcy and rejects the licensing agreement at issue. Relying on the language of section 365(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Supreme Court emphasized that a debtor’s rejection of an executory contract has the “same effect as a breach of that contract outside bankruptcy” and that rejection “cannot rescind rights that the contract previously granted.”