For decades, restructuring and insolvency matters in the Dominican Republic involving merchants and companies in non-regulated industries have been carried out on a “de facto” basis, due to the obsolescence of the existing legal framework and institutions. Fortunately, that is not the case anymore.

The recent case ofCrumper v Candey Ltd [2017] EWCH 1511 (Ch) delivered an updated analysis of the operation of section 245 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (“s245”). Although the insolvency proceedings (and much of the litigation before and after the insolvency commenced) originated in the British Virgin Islands, they were recognised in England and Wales under the Cross Border Insolvency Regulations 2006.

Late last month, the Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari review of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in PEM Entities LLC v. Eric M. Levin & Howard Shareff. At issue in PEM Entities is whether a debt claim held by existing equity investors should be recharacterized as equity. The Supreme Court is now poised to resolve a split among the federal circuits concerning whether federal or state law should govern debt recharacterization claims.

When reviewing a security for costs application under CPR 25.12, the courts are faced with the challenge of striking a balance between an impecunious claimant’s access to justice and the possibility of a successful defendant being unable to recover their costs. This is because the general rule in relation to costs under CPR 44.2 is that the unsuccessful party will pay the costs of the successful party.

We have written in the past about the doctrine of equitable mootness. A March 30, 2017 per curiam affirmance by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Beem v. Ferguson (In re Ferguson) explores the concept and limitations of equitable mootness and distinguishes it from the related doctrine of constitutional mootness.

What can a lender do about successive bankruptcy filings by a borrower? What can lessors do when their tenants file successive bankruptcy petitions? A recent decision by a bankruptcy court in the Eastern District of New York gives guidance on these questions.

In a prior post, we discussed the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Jevic Holding Corp., where the court upheld the use of so-called “structured dismissals” in bankruptcy cases, and the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari. Yesterday, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Jevic. The Court’s ultimate ruling will likely have a significant impact upon bankruptcy practice.

The High Court has recently held that an individual may claim the proceeds of the sale of assets subject to an agricultural charge by the application of the equitable remedy of marshalling.

Agricultural Sector

What does it mean to “cure” a default in the context of a plan of reorganization? This question arises by virtue of section 1123(a)(5)(G) of the Bankruptcy Code, which requires that a plan provide adequate means for the plan’s implementation, including the “curing or waiving of any default.” On November 4, 2016, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals defined what it means to “cure” by holding that a debtor can only cure a contractual default under a plan of reorganization by complying with contractual post-default interest rate provisions.

The presumption that courts normally validate dispositions by a company subject to a winding up petition if such dispositions are made in good faith and in the ordinary course of business has been called into question in the recent case of Express Electrical Distributors Ltd v Beavis and others [2016].