As we close the week which has seen the Government and the Bank of England publish details of their financial support package for business, the business community awaits the formal launch of both the Coronovirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CBILS) and the Covid Corporate Financing Facility (CCFF) next week.

CBIL scheme

On 4 February 2020, the Federal Court of Australia considered the circumstances in which it might be said that a provisional liquidator of a company ought not be appointed as the official liquidator because of an alleged "reasonable apprehension of bias". The issue was ventilated before the Court in the matter of  Frisken (as receiver of Avant Garde Investments Pty Ltd v Cheema [2020] FCA 98.

Appointing a provisional liquidator

Entering into liquidation can be a scary time for any company and its officers, even one which chooses to do so voluntarily. However, the directors, shareholders and creditors of a company entering into liquidation do not have absolute discretion as to who they may appoint as the liquidator of the company. Together, the Corporations Act and common law principles of independence regulate the eligibility of a liquidator to be appointed to a company, and to remain in the appointment.

Overarching eligibility

In the recent decision of Boensch as Trustee of the Boensch Trust v Scott Darren Pascoe [2019] HCA 49, the High Court has clarified whether property held by a bankrupt on trust for another vests in the bankrupt's trustee in bankruptcy, and the circumstances in which a trustee in bankruptcy will have reasonable cause to lodge a caveat to protect an interest in the trust property.

Background

In the recent decision of In the matter of Parkway One Pty Limited (in liquidation) [2019] NSWSC 1495 (Parkway), Rees J dismissed an application to terminate the winding up of Parkway One Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (the Company) due to inconclusive evidence as to the solvency of the Company and, having regard to the non-compliance by its director of her statutory duties and the likelihood of the Company not being able to service the current and foreseen indebtedness, her Honour held that it would be contrary to commercial morality to terminate the wi

The hair salon Regis announced recently that the company has entered administration. The news might not come as a surprise because the chain, prior to the company’s administration, was subject to a company voluntary arrangement (“CVA”) whose validity was challenged by landlords.

The joint administrator of Regis commented: “trading challenges, coupled with the uncertainty caused by the legal challenge, have necessitated the need for an administration appointment”.

The decision of the High Court of Australia in Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28; 261 CLR 132 (Ramsay) clarified the limits of a Bankruptcy Court's discretion to "go behind" a judgment, that is, to investigate whether the underlying debt relied upon for the making of a sequestration order is, in truth and reality, owing to the petitioning creditor. Recently, the Ramsay decision was applied by the Federal Court of Australia in Dunkerley v Comcare [2019] FCA 1002 (Dunkerley).

Today the Government published draft provisions for inclusion in the Finance Bill which will amend the Insolvency Act 1986 and grant HMRC preferential status on insolvency. A status that was removed in 2003 but which will be re-instated (in part) from 6 April 2020.

Despite huge concern from the lending market, voiced in responses to the Government’s consultation on this measure, the only material change we can see is confirmation that preferential status will not apply to insolvency proceedings commenced before 6 April 2020.

Liquidators are encouraged to seek advice or directions from the Court as to the discharge of their responsibilities. But who bears the costs of such proceedings, of the liquidator and of any contradictor involved?

In the recent case of In the matter of Gondon Five Pty Limited and Cui Family Asset Management Pty Limited [2019] NSWSC 469, the New South Wales Supreme Court (Brereton J) considered the purpose and scope of an appointment as receiver to a company, and came down particularly hard on an insolvency practitioner for performing work and incurring expenses which were determined to be outside, or not incidental to, the scope of his appointment.

Background