HMRC has taken an increasingly active role in opposing restructuring plans with which it does not agree

Previously in this series, we explored whether restructuring plans present an alternative to formal insolvency, as well as the court's ability to exercise a cross-class cram down on opposing creditors.

Even if the statutory conditions for cramming down the votes of dissenting creditors has been met, the court retains a discretion to consider other factors

Certain statutory conditions need to be met in order for the court to sanction a plan at least one class of creditors or members has not voted in favour of the plan by the requisite majority (being 75% in value of those present and voting) – referred to as the "cross-class cram down".

Demonstrating that dissenting creditors are no worse off under a contested restructuring plan than in the relevant alternative is an essential requirement for the court to exercise its power to sanction the plan

The power of the court to sanction a restructuring plan where one or more classes of creditors or members has not voted in favour of the plan by the requisite majority (being 75% in value of those present and voting) is referred to as the "cross-class cram down".

Demonstrating what would most likely happen if a restructuring plan were not sanctioned is an essential element for the exercise of the court's discretion to cram down the votes of dissenting creditors

Restructuring plans under Part 26A of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006) may provide an alternative for companies in financial distress to formal insolvency (see our previous Insight).

Restructuring plans can provide companies in the early stages of financial difficulty with a flexible alternative to entering a formal insolvency procedure

Under Part 26A of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006), companies or groups encountering financial difficulties affecting their ability to carry on business can propose a compromise or arrangement (a restructuring plan) which mitigates or eliminates the effects of those financial difficulties.

A floating charge debenture holder has the advantage that they can enforce their security by appointing their choice of administrators. This is a powerful and useful tool for lenders but is subject to the caveat that the debenture has to be “qualifying”.

As far as they go, restructuring plans have worked well since they were first introduced 3 years ago. This is reflected in the most recent review of CIGA published by the Insolvency Service which reflects favourably on this new insolvency measure. However, there are still some barriers to its use.

The three year review of CIGA (the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act) published by the Insolvency Service suggests that we might see changes to the corporate moratorium process – will these address concerns about the process and encourage more insolvency practitioners to recommend its use?

It’s now level pegging for HMRC on cram down – twice it has been crammed down, and twice it has not.

In the most recent restructuring plan proposed by Prezzo, the court sanctioned the company’s restructuring plan and crammed down HMRC as both preferential and unsecured creditor. Unlike Houst’s restructuring plan, where HMRC was also crammed down, HMRC fiercely contested the plan proposed by Prezzo.

Snapshot

The Restructuring Plan (Plan) was introduced as part of the UK Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020, which introduced a new part 26A into the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006). The part 26A Plan provisions are largely based on the existing scheme of arrangement rules detailed under part 26 of the CA 2006, and it is often referred to as the “super scheme”.

Plans now sit alongside schemes of arrangement and company voluntary arrangements (CVAs) to provide a further restructuring option for companies and insolvency practitioners alike.