The law allows any person to be treated as a director even though that person has not been formally appointed as a director. Such directors are known as de-facto directors. By contrast, a de jure director is a person who has been validly appointed as a director.

The recent case of Re Snelling House Ltd (In Liquidation) [2012] EWHC 440 (Ch) serves as a useful reminder to consider possible claims against de-facto directors who may be acting under the wrong impression that they are beyond reprehension.

The facts

 The Court of Appeal has held that a transfer on an administration cannot be caught by TUPE rules, unlike on insolvency proceedings. As such administrations will not be “insolvency proceedings” for the purposes of the exemption to TUPE.

What does this mean?

Businesses who purchase companies who have been placed into administration will take on the liability under TUPE for the company’s employees. Employees will transfer under TUPE and  will be protected from transfer- connected dismissals.

What should employers do?

In what circumstances might an individual administrator be liable for discrimination against employees of companies in administration? This was the question the Employment Tribunal asked itself in the case of Spencer v Lehman Brothers (in administration) and others.

Since the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 were made in order to implement the European Union’s Council Directive 80/987/EEC, there has been an ongoing debate on how regulation 8 (7) (the bankruptcy proceedings exception) should be interpreted. Fortunately, a recent decision by the Employment Appeals Tribunal has gone some way towards clarifying the issue.

The law has for years tried to grapple with the Gordian Knot between protecting a debtor’s assets for realisation and distribution to his creditors and protecting third parties who enter into transactions with the debtor after the bankruptcy process has been initiated, completely unaware of that process.