The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision today in Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 581 U.S. ___, No. 16-348, draws attention in passing to a peculiar feature of Wisconsin law on the effect of statutes of limitations.

The Bankruptcy Code permits a bankruptcy trustee to compel return of a payment made to a creditor within 90 days before a bankruptcy petition. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A). The justification for compelling the return of preference payments is to level the playing field among creditors by not rewarding those who, perhaps, pressed the debtor the hardest on the eve of bankruptcy.

As we explained in a post yesterday, the Seventh Circuit in In re Bronk (Cirilli v.

In re Bronk (Cirilli v. Bronk), No. 13-1123 (7th Cir. Jan. 5, 2015), resolved a couple of “questions of first impression,” slip op.

The power of an appellate court in the federal system to stay the orders of lower courts or to enjoin conduct that lower courts have refused to enjoin, so as to preserve the appellate court’s jurisdiction to review those orders on ultimate appeal, is clearly established yet infrequently invoked. In addition to other potential sources, the power derives from the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.

On July 9, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued a decision in Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Mfg., LLC (No. 11-3920), a case that addresses the effect of a bankruptcy trustee's rejection of trademark licenses. For years, the Bankruptcy Code's definition of "intellectual property" has excluded trademarks. But the Code provides very specific guidelines on the treatment of other intellectual property licenses in section 365(n), which was added by Congress in 1988 following the Fourth Circuit's decision in Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc.