The U.S. Supreme Court reversed confirmation of Purdue Pharma’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan of reorganization on the basis that its non-consensual third-party releases were not permissible. It held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize the inclusion of a release in a plan that effectively seeks to discharge claims against a non-debtor without the consent of affected claimants. The decision prohibits an approach to global resolution of mass tort litigations that has been utilized in numerous cases over the last 40 years.
Takeaways
Opinion has potential implications for a broader set of parties with potential liabilities affected by a Chapter 11 process.
Intercreditor agreements between secured creditors are intended to limit the potential for litigation and result in predictable commercial outcomes with respect to recoveries from collateral in enforcement actions and bankruptcies. Despite the extensive drafting efforts of sophisticated counsel to eliminate ambiguities in these agreements, the interpretation of intercreditor agreements has been the subject of substantial bankruptcy litigation.
In a June 3, 2016 decision1 , the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (“the Bankruptcy Court”) invalidated, on federal public policy grounds, a provision in the debtorLLC’s operating agreement that it viewed as hindering the LLC’s right to file for bankruptcy. Such provision provided that the consent of all members of the LLC, including a creditor holding a so-called “golden share” received pursuant to a forbearance agreement, was required for the debtor to commence a voluntary bankruptcy case.
In a blow to the Lehman Chapter 11 estates, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held on September 16, 2015 that Intel Corporation’s Loss calculation resulting from a failed transaction under an ISDA Master Agreement was appropriate.1 The decision is significant both because of the dearth of judicial interpretation of the ISDA mechanics regarding the calculation of early termination amounts, and because it affirms the general market understanding that a non-defaulting party has broad discretion in calculating “Loss,” so long as its