Exploring the bounds of concreteness and traceability following the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, the Sixth Circuit in Krueger v. Experian, et al. recently reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of a lender in a Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) case, finding that the plaintiff had a sufficiently concrete injury to support Article III standing.

The Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) was a forgivable loan program administered by the US Small Business Administration (“SBA”) that was created as part of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”) in March 2020. The PPP ended on May 31, 2021. Since the passage of the CARES Act, litigation has ensued over whether companies in bankruptcy are eligible to receive PPP loans.

In Shameeka Ien v. TransCare Corp., et al. (In re TransCareCorp.), Case No. 16-10407, Adv. P. No. 16-01033 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2020) [D.I. 157], the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently refused to dismiss WARN Act claims against Patriarch Partners, LLC, private equity firm (“PE Firm“), and its owner, Lynn Tilton (“PE Owner“), resulting from the staggered chapter 7 bankruptcies of several portfolio companies, TransCare Corporation and its affiliates (collectively, the “Debtors“).

Joining three other bankruptcy courts, Judge Thuma of the District of New Mexico recently held that the rules issued by the Small Business Administration (“SBA“) that restrict bankrupt entities from participating in the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP“) violated the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, H.R. 748, P.L. 115-136 (the “CARES Act”), as well as section 525(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.

The Southern District of New York recently reminded us in In re Firestar Diamond, Inc., et al., Case No. 18-10509 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. April 22, 2019) (SHL) [Dkt. No. 1482] that equitable principles in bankruptcy often do not match those outside of bankruptcy. Indeed, bankruptcy decisions often place emphasis on equality of treatment amongst all creditors and are less concerned with inequities to individual creditors.

Introduction

In Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., f/b/o Jerome Guyant, IRA v. Highland Construction Management Services, L.P. et al., Nos. 18-2450-52 (4th Cir. March 17, 2020), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently upheld that a borrower’s indirect economic interests in a limited liability company (LLC) were not assigned to a lender under a conveyance in a security agreement assigning mere membership interests, pursuant to Virginia state law.

Facts

Setoff is a right that allows a creditor to offset a prepetition debt owed to a debtor with its prepetition claim against the debtor.  See In re Luongo, 259 F.3d 323, 334 (5th Cir.

Setoff is a right that allows a creditor to offset a prepetition debt owed to a debtor with its prepetition claim against the debtor. See In re Luongo, 259 F.3d 323, 334 (5th Cir. 2001). This remedy is aimed at preventing the inequitable and inefficient result that occurs when a creditor is forced to pay a 100% of its prepetition debt owed to a debtor, without resolving its prepetition claim. In such circumstances, the creditor is often forced to later prosecute its unresolved claim against the debtor and is commonly only awarded a fraction of the value of its claim.

Bankruptcy and class actions each establish elaborate procedures and provide a convenient forum to resolve numerous claims against one or more defendants, in an efficient manner. However, while a class action focuses on providing adequate representation to claimants with similar claims, bankruptcy focuses on enabling an insolvent company to reorganize. The two goals do not necessarily blend well in every circumstance.