In a significant ruling impacting commercial real estate lenders in Michigan, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that an absolute assignment of rents that had been fully perfected (by demanding payment from tenants to the lender and related recording) precludes a debtor from asserting that such rents can be used as cash collateral in bankruptcy. The reasoning is that these rents do not constitute property of the bankruptcy estate. As such, the debtor could not proceed with its Chapter 11 case.
Background
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision today in Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 581 U.S. ___, No. 16-348, draws attention in passing to a peculiar feature of Wisconsin law on the effect of statutes of limitations.
The Bankruptcy Code permits a bankruptcy trustee to compel return of a payment made to a creditor within 90 days before a bankruptcy petition. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A). The justification for compelling the return of preference payments is to level the playing field among creditors by not rewarding those who, perhaps, pressed the debtor the hardest on the eve of bankruptcy.
While American manufacturing has experienced a resurgence in recent years, some manufacturers continue to face challenges.
The automotive industry has recently enjoyed a strong period of sales growth and productivity. But even during this period, some manufacturers and raw materials suppliers continue to face pressures presented by financially troubled customers and suppliers. Witness for example the recent chapter 11 filings of Lee Steel Corporation and Chassix Holdings, Inc.
As we explained in a post yesterday, the Seventh Circuit in In re Bronk (Cirilli v.
In re Bronk (Cirilli v. Bronk), No. 13-1123 (7th Cir. Jan. 5, 2015), resolved a couple of “questions of first impression,” slip op.
The debtor in Law listed his house on his bankruptcy schedules, claiming a homestead exemption in the amount of $75,000 under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 704.730(a)(1). The debtor represented that the house was encumbered by two liens: a note and deed of trust for $147,156.52 in favor of Washington Mutual Bank, and a second note and deed of trust for $156,929.04 in favor of “Lin’s Mortgage & Associates.” Based on these representations, the debtor made it appear as if there was no nonexempt value in the house that the trustee could realize for the benefit of the estate.
The power of an appellate court in the federal system to stay the orders of lower courts or to enjoin conduct that lower courts have refused to enjoin, so as to preserve the appellate court’s jurisdiction to review those orders on ultimate appeal, is clearly established yet infrequently invoked. In addition to other potential sources, the power derives from the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.