On May 25, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (the “Court”) affirmed a district court’s affirmance of a bankruptcy court’s decision in In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp. that permitted a debtor to reject a midstream gathering agreement as an “executory contract.”1 The Court’s decision, which is the first Court of Appeals to address the rejection of a midstream gathering agreement, firmly establishes a debtor’s right to do so under certain circumstances.

BACKGROUND

The Court of Appeal has helpfully confirmed that a judgment creditor can seek an order appointing a receiver by way of equitable execution where:

• the debtor holds a legal or equitable interest in property; and
• execution against the property is not available at law by one of the usual methods, for instance via the sheriff or by a garnishee order.

There was previously doubt as to whether such a receiver could be appointed where the debtor held a legal, as opposed to an equitable interest, in property.

The High Court has recently expressed concern that distressed borrowers are being duped into paying money to the anonymous promoters of schemes, which purport to protect them from enforcement by lenders but are actually ‘utterly misguided and spurious’.

There are a number of schemes being promoted at the moment that supposedly protect borrowers in arrears from enforcement by their lender.

Simple retention of title clauses are commonplace and generally effective in contracts for the sale of goods. However, extending their effect to the proceeds of sale of such goods requires careful drafting.

The Court of Appeal has provided some further clarity around the creation and effects of fiduciary obligations in relation to such clauses.[1]

Proceeds of sale clauses

The High Court has reiterated that cross-examination will not generally be permitted on an interlocutory application, or where there is no conflict of fact on the affidavits.

In McCarthy v Murphy,^[1] the defendant mortgagor was not permitted to cross-examine the plaintiff (a receiver) or a bank employee who swore a supporting affidavit.

Background

Two recent judgments have brought further clarity in relation to the rights acquirers of loan portfolios to enforce against borrowers:

In AIB Mortgage Bank -v- O'Toole & anor [2016] IEHC 368 the High Court determined that a bank was not prevented from relying on a mortgage as security for all sums due by the defendants, despite issuing a redemption statement which omitted this fact.

In order to understand this case, it is necessary to set out the chronology of events:

Bankruptcy law in Ireland is now, broadly speaking, in line with that of the United Kingdom.

In particular, for bankrupts who cooperate with the bankruptcy process:

• bankruptcy will end in one year; and
• their interest in their family home will re-vest in them after 3 years.

Notably however, the courts will have discretion to extend the period of bankruptcy for up to 15 years for non-cooperative individuals and those who have concealed or transferred assets to the detriment of creditors.

The Supreme Court has held that a floating charge, crystallised by notice, prior to the commencement of a winding up, ranks ahead of preferential creditors. However, the Court expressed the view that the relevant legislation needs to be amended to reverse the “undoubtedly unsatisfactory outcome”.

Background

On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in a 2-1 opinion, recognized a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case could be dismissed through a “structured dismissal” that deviates from the priority scheme set forth in Section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code.1 With its decision, the Third Circuit joined the Second Circuit in rejecting the Fifth Circuit’s per se exclusion on “structured dismissals” that deviate from the Bankruptcy Code’s prio