On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, which had approved the structured dismissal of the Chapter 11 cases of Jevic Holding Corp., et al. The Court of Appeals first held that structured dismissals are not prohibited by the Bankruptcy Code, and then upheld the structured dismissal in the Jevic case, despite the fact that the settlement embodied in the structured dismissal order deviated from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme.

In a memorandum decision dated May 4, 2015, Judge Vincent L. Briccetti of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York affirmed the September 2014 decision of Judge Robert D. Drain of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, confirming the joint plans of reorganization (the “Plan”) in the Chapter 11 cases of MPM Silicones LLC and its affiliates (“Momentive”). Appeals were taken on three separate parts of Judge Drain’s confirmation decision, each of which ultimately was affirmed by the district court:

On 13 May 2015, the Government announced that it intends to give the courts the power to overrule the rejection by secured creditors of arrangements under the Personal Insolvency Act 2012 (the “Act”).

There is scant detail in the announcement save that it is intended to “support mortgage holders who are in arrears” and that legislation is to be brought forward before the Summer recess. How is such legislation likely to work and what potential frailties could it have?

The Issue

Insolvency practitioners often encounter difficulties when trying to sell properties in residential developments because an original management company has been struck off the Register of Companies. The standard approach can be laborious and costly. A more cost efficient alternative is often available.

In a number of recent cases, borrowers have produced a detailed forensic analysis of the accrual of interest on their accounts by lenders alleging that any error in the calculation of interest invalidates the demand made by the lender and any appointment of a receiver on foot thereof.

Dealing a major blow to the trustee’s efforts to recover fraudulent transfers on behalf of the bankruptcy estate of the company run by Bernard Madoff, Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held in SIPC v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC¹ that the Bankruptcy Code cannot be used to recover fraudulent transfers of funds that occur entirely outside the United States.

InJ.D. Brian Ltd (in liquidation) & Others the High Court held that, where a floating charge crystallised prior to the commencement of a winding-up, the preferential creditors still had priority pursuant to in section 285 of the Companies Act 1963 over the holder of what had become a fixed charge.

The English court of appeal has held that a company should not be held to be balance sheet insolvent on the sole basis that its liabilities (including contingent and prospective liabilities) exceed its assets.

In BNY Corporate Trustee Services v Eurosail & Ors, the Court of Appeal considered in detail, for the first time, the construction of section 123 of the UK Insolvency Act 1986, which sets out circumstances in which a company can be deemed to be unable to pay its debts.

The relevant portions of section 123 provide as follows:

In Re: Michael McLoughlin Pharmacy Ltd. The examiner sought the High Court’s approval for a scheme of arrangement which limited his liability for negligence. The secured creditor objected as a matter of principle because such limitations of liability had become commonplace in schemes. The secured creditor made it clear that there was no suggestion of any negligence by the examiner in the particular case.

The court considered:

InDellway and Ors. v National Asset Management Agency & Ors., a number of companies and Paddy McKillen appealed a decision of the High Court in relation to the purported acquisition of €2∙1 billion in loans to the appellant companies by NAMA.

The appeal was brought on five grounds: