In a recent case involving key stakeholders in the ‘Century Mine’ (Mine) – located in the lower Gulf of Carpentaria region in Northwest Queensland – the Supreme Court of Queensland considered an application brought by a liquidator and creditor for the termination of a winding up of pursuant to section 482(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Application).

Background

The Mine was operated by Century Mining Ltd (formerly Century Zinc Ltd) (Century). It was one of the largest zinc mines in the world.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently ruled in a case involving a Chapter 13 debtors’ attempt to shield contributions to a 401(k) retirement account from “projected disposable income,” therefore making such amounts inaccessible to the debtors’ creditors.^[1] For the reasons explained below, the Sixth Circuit rejected the debtors’ arguments.

Case Background

A statute must be interpreted and enforced as written, regardless, according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, “of whether a court likes the results of that application in a particular case.” That legal maxim guided the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in a recent decision^[1] in a case involving a Chapter 13 debtor’s repeated filings and requests for dismissal of his bankruptcy cases in order to avoid foreclosure of his home.

The Federal Court’s recent decision in Kellendonk concerned a $350,000 loan made by the applicants, Mr and Mrs Kellendonk, to Ms Maria Jasienska-Dudek to help her buy a property in Midland, Western Australia (Property). Ms Jasienska-Dudek defaulted under the loan agreement and the parties subsequently entered an informal agreement which, after Ms Jasienska-Dudek became a bankrupt, led to some novel circumstances and a novel application of section 133 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Bankruptcy Act).

In Re Cullen Group,[1] the Supreme Court of Queensland considered the determination of a preliminary question regarding the insolvency of Cullen Group Australia Pty Ltd (Cullen Group), which was placed into liquidation approximately four years prior to the hearing date.

On January 14, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court decided City of Chicago, Illinois v. Fulton (Case No. 19-357, Jan. 14, 2021), a case which examined whether merely retaining estate property after a bankruptcy filing violates the automatic stay provided for by §362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court overruled the bankruptcy court and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in deciding that mere retention of property does not violate the automatic stay.

Case Background

When an individual files a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, the debtor’s non-exempt assets become property of the estate that is used to pay creditors. “Property of the estate” is a defined term under the Bankruptcy Code, so a disputed question in many cases is: What assets are, in fact, available to creditors?

In the recent decision of Cant v Mad Brothers Earthmoving,[1] the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria (Justices Beach, McLeish and Hargrave) considered whether the liquidator of Eliana Construction and Developing Group (in liquidation) (Eliana) could establish that a payment made to an unsecured creditor of Eliana by one of Eliana’s related companies was an unfair preference.

In the recent Gunns decisions, the Federal Court considered three separate unfair preference claims brought by the liquidators of Gunns Limited (in Liquidation) (Gunns) against:

Once a Chapter 7 debtor receives a discharge of personal debts, creditors are enjoined from taking action to collect, recover, or offset such debts. However, unlike personal debts, liens held by secured creditors “ride through” bankruptcy. The underlying debt secured by the lien may be extinguished, but as long as the lien is valid it survives the bankruptcy.