In the recent case of Hadley v BetHQ Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 1263, the debtor company, BetHQ, came to grief when a statutory demand was validly served at the company’s registered office in Brisbane as shown in ASIC records. The premises were a serviced office; however BetHQ had ceased operations at the serviced office and had moved its operations to Victoria.

When a secured creditor appoints a receiver it is usual for them to sign an agreement setting out the terms of the receiver’s appointment, including payment of the receiver’s remuneration, costs and expenses. Appointment documents commonly contain indemnity clauses in which the secured creditor agrees to indemnify the receiver in specified circumstances.

In our previous bulletin we discussed the ‘safe harbour’ model in the Government’s suggested reforms to the current insolvency laws.

This bulletin considers another of the focus questions in the Proposal Paper: the voiding of ipso facto clauses relating to insolvency events.

Background

On 29 April 2016, the Federal Government released a Proposals Paper titled ‘Improving bankruptcy and insolvency laws’.

The Government is proposing these reforms to encourage entrepreneurship and investment. It hopes to reduce the stigma and detriment around failed business ventures, while still balancing the need to protect creditors.

On January 15, 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the “Third Circuit”) held in In re Trump Entertainment Resorts that section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor to reject an expired collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”).

Where a court has ordered the winding-up of a company, a shareholder may be able to have the winding up terminated under section 482 of the Corporations Act 2001.

Relevant factors

The power of the court to terminate a winding-up is discretionary. Relevant factors to be considered, which are not exhaustive, include the following:

If a director can exercise a right of set-off against a company in liquidation for a debt owed to the director or for a liability of the company to the director (which may be unascertained in amount or contingent), it may help to cancel out or significantly reduce the director’s liability to the company for insolvent trading.

On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the “Third Circuit”) affirmed the order of the United States District Court for the District of Delaware in Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Group/Business Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.) approving a settlement and dismissal of a chapter 11 case by way of a “structured dismissal.” A structured dismissal is, simply, the dismissal of the bankruptcy case preceded by other orders, such as an order approving a settlement or granting releases, which survive dismissal of the case.

On May 4, 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the order of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit dismissing the appeal of chapter 13 debtor Luis Bullard for lack of jurisdiction.1 The Court held that the order of the Bankruptcy Court denying confirmation of Bullard’s proposed chapter 13 plan was not a final order from which Bullard could immediately appeal as of right.2 The Court reasoned that, while confirmation of a plan can be said to fix the rights and obligations of the parties in a way that alters the status quo, d

In Allco Funds Management Limited v Trust Co (Re Services) Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1251, an inter-company loan transaction was challenged by a receiver appointed by the secured creditor to one of the companies. Common directors were involved in the transaction. The issue was whether the directors breached their fiduciary duties entitling the company via the receiver to have the transaction set aside.

The background to the case