Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.

Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.

Recently, insolvency law was fundamentally amended in terms of reorganization procedures. The tax legislation was subsequently adapted to these new procedures, at the same time changing the content of some important tax rules.

The most important change is that a waiver of debt within the framework of a reorganization agreement becomes less interesting from a tax point of view. You will find out exactly how this works in this article.

Het insolventierecht onderging recent een grote wijziging op het gebied van de reorganisatieprocedures. De fiscale wetgeving werd vervolgens aan deze nieuwe procedures aangepast en daarbij werden tegelijk ook de inhoud van een aantal belangrijke fiscale regels gewijzigd.

De belangrijkste wijziging heeft als gevolg dat een schuldkwijtschelding binnen het kader van een reorganisatieakkoord fiscaal minder interessant wordt. Hoe dat precies zit, verneemt u in dit artikel.

Le droit de l'insolvabilité a récemment fait l'objet d'un changement majeur en ce qui concerne les procédures de réorganisation. La législation fiscale a ensuite été adaptée à ces nouvelles procédures, tout en modifiant le contenu de certaines règles fiscales importantes.

Le changement le plus important a pour conséquence qu'un apurement des dettes dans le cadre d'un accord de réorganisation devient moins intéressant du point de vue fiscal. Dans cet article, vous découvrirez comment cela fonctionne exactement.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently ruled in a case involving a Chapter 13 debtors’ attempt to shield contributions to a 401(k) retirement account from “projected disposable income,” therefore making such amounts inaccessible to the debtors’ creditors.^[1] For the reasons explained below, the Sixth Circuit rejected the debtors’ arguments.

Case Background

A statute must be interpreted and enforced as written, regardless, according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, “of whether a court likes the results of that application in a particular case.” That legal maxim guided the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in a recent decision^[1] in a case involving a Chapter 13 debtor’s repeated filings and requests for dismissal of his bankruptcy cases in order to avoid foreclosure of his home.

On January 14, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court decided City of Chicago, Illinois v. Fulton (Case No. 19-357, Jan. 14, 2021), a case which examined whether merely retaining estate property after a bankruptcy filing violates the automatic stay provided for by §362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court overruled the bankruptcy court and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in deciding that mere retention of property does not violate the automatic stay.

Case Background

When an individual files a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, the debtor’s non-exempt assets become property of the estate that is used to pay creditors. “Property of the estate” is a defined term under the Bankruptcy Code, so a disputed question in many cases is: What assets are, in fact, available to creditors?

Once a Chapter 7 debtor receives a discharge of personal debts, creditors are enjoined from taking action to collect, recover, or offset such debts. However, unlike personal debts, liens held by secured creditors “ride through” bankruptcy. The underlying debt secured by the lien may be extinguished, but as long as the lien is valid it survives the bankruptcy.