Building on the successes of the first three conferences, the Insolvency Service held its "Forward Thinking" conference in April 2025. The organisers invited academics and practitioners to submit papers in advance. From the shortlist, the organisers selected a handful of the authors to present their papers at the conference.

The content of the papers, and the debate generated at the conference, will hopefully help the Insolvency Service in terms of selecting and crafting new legislative initiatives, going forward.

Highlights included:

Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.

Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.

In R (on the application of Palmer) v Northern Derbyshire Magistrates' Court [2023] UKSC 38, the Supreme Court has ruled that an administrator appointed under the Insolvency Act 1986 is not an "officer" of the company.

This case considered this issue within the meaning of section 194 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (the TULRCA). As a result of the Supreme Court's decision, administrators will not be exposed to potential criminal liability for failing to notify the Secretary of State of collective redundancies.

Amendments to the director disqualification regime, enacted in 2015, enable the Insolvency Service (on the request of a creditor of an insolvent company) to seek a compensatory remedy against a disqualified director for the benefit of the creditor(s). This empowers a creditor to take action where an insolvency officer may be unable, or unwilling, to do so.

This case relates to the principle that creditors with the benefit of a third-party debt order, are ostensibly in a better position than other unsecured creditors of an insolvent estate.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently ruled in a case involving a Chapter 13 debtors’ attempt to shield contributions to a 401(k) retirement account from “projected disposable income,” therefore making such amounts inaccessible to the debtors’ creditors.^[1] For the reasons explained below, the Sixth Circuit rejected the debtors’ arguments.

Case Background

A statute must be interpreted and enforced as written, regardless, according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, “of whether a court likes the results of that application in a particular case.” That legal maxim guided the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in a recent decision^[1] in a case involving a Chapter 13 debtor’s repeated filings and requests for dismissal of his bankruptcy cases in order to avoid foreclosure of his home.

On January 14, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court decided City of Chicago, Illinois v. Fulton (Case No. 19-357, Jan. 14, 2021), a case which examined whether merely retaining estate property after a bankruptcy filing violates the automatic stay provided for by §362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court overruled the bankruptcy court and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in deciding that mere retention of property does not violate the automatic stay.

Case Background

When an individual files a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, the debtor’s non-exempt assets become property of the estate that is used to pay creditors. “Property of the estate” is a defined term under the Bankruptcy Code, so a disputed question in many cases is: What assets are, in fact, available to creditors?