Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.

Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.

The Privy Council has handed down judgment in two appeals (ETJL v Halabi; ITGL v Fort Trustees [2022] UKPC 36) concerning the nature and scope of the right of a trustee to recover from or be indemnified out of trust assets in respect of liabilities and other expenditure properly incurred by the trustee. A seven-member Board was convened because the Privy Council was asked to reconsider part of its decision in Investec Trust (Guernsey) Ltd v Glenalla Properties Ltd [2019] AC 271.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently ruled in a case involving a Chapter 13 debtors’ attempt to shield contributions to a 401(k) retirement account from “projected disposable income,” therefore making such amounts inaccessible to the debtors’ creditors.^[1] For the reasons explained below, the Sixth Circuit rejected the debtors’ arguments.

Case Background

A statute must be interpreted and enforced as written, regardless, according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, “of whether a court likes the results of that application in a particular case.” That legal maxim guided the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in a recent decision^[1] in a case involving a Chapter 13 debtor’s repeated filings and requests for dismissal of his bankruptcy cases in order to avoid foreclosure of his home.

Last Friday, the Court of Appeal handed down judgment in Al Jaber v Mitchell [2021] EWCA Civ 1190, a keenly awaited decision which considers with the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit to statements given by a former director during an examination under section 236 Insolvency Act 1986.

The High Court has had to grapple with the application of witness immunity and the unique examination process under section 236 Insolvency Act 1986. Witness immunity (or immunity from suit) provides that no witness, party, counsel or judge may be liable for words spoken or evidence given in court proceedings; it is an absolute immunity from any civil proceedings based on such conduct.

The High Court has had to grapple with the application of witness immunity and the unique examination process under section 236 Insolvency Act 1986. Witness immunity (or immunity from suit) provides that no witness, party, counsel or judge may be liable for words spoken or evidence given in court proceedings; it is an absolute immunity from any civil proceedings based on such conduct.

On January 14, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court decided City of Chicago, Illinois v. Fulton (Case No. 19-357, Jan. 14, 2021), a case which examined whether merely retaining estate property after a bankruptcy filing violates the automatic stay provided for by §362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court overruled the bankruptcy court and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in deciding that mere retention of property does not violate the automatic stay.

Case Background

When an individual files a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, the debtor’s non-exempt assets become property of the estate that is used to pay creditors. “Property of the estate” is a defined term under the Bankruptcy Code, so a disputed question in many cases is: What assets are, in fact, available to creditors?