The Bottom Line

In Gavin/Solmonese LLC, Liquidation Trustee for the Citadel Creditors’ Grantor Trust, successor to Citadel Watford City Disposal Partners, L.P., et al. v. Citadel Energy Partners, LLC, et al., Ch. 11 Case No. 15-11323; Adv. Proc. No. 17-50024 (Bankr. D. Del. May 2, 2019) (“Citadel”), the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that creditors of insolvent limited partnerships and limited liability companies do not have standing to sue derivatively on behalf of the company under applicable state law.

This chapter is taken from Lexology GTDT’s Practice Guide to Franchise, examining key themes topical to cross border franchising.

Introduction

We’ve all heard it said a million times - if it sounds too good to be true, it probably is. But does that age-old maxim apply to a bankrupt customer offering to pay you 100% of your unsecured claim through a “prepackaged” bankruptcy or under a critical vendor program? The answer can be complicated. 

This article explores what it means to be “unimpaired” and paid in full in prepackaged bankruptcies and under critical vendor programs and outlines some of the potential pitfalls that can be faced by unsecured creditors under these scenarios.

When your customer is in bankruptcy, there are two major no-nos that you must remember.

First, don't violate the automatic stay, which prevents a creditor from attempting to collect a debt while the debtor is in bankruptcy unless the creditor gets prior court approval. Second, don't violate the discharge injunction, which absolves a debtor of liability for those debts covered by the bankruptcy court's discharge order. The automatic stay takes effect when the debtor files bankruptcy, while the discharge injunction typically comes at the end of the case.

Delaware Bankruptcy Judge Brendan Shannon granted mechanic’s lien claimants $1.6 million for making a substantial contribution in a case by “demonstrably and materially facilitating the process of reorganization.” In re M & G USA Corp., No. 17-12307, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 1398 (Bankr. D. Del.

In Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. PG&E, 549 U.S. 443 (2007), the Supreme Court held that bankruptcy law does not disallow a post-petition unsecured claim for attorney’s fees to the extent such claim is authorized by a pre-petition contract and not otherwise expressly disallowed. That pronouncement should have stopped all future litigation over the issue. That has not been the case.

Under title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”), generally speaking, payments by insolvent debtors to an unsecured or undersecured creditor on pre-existing indebtedness (so-called “antecedent debt”) made during the 90-day period before the debtor’s bankruptcy filing (the “Preference Period”) are vulnerable to claw-back in the debtor’s bankruptcy case as voidable preferences.

Federal law has long excepted student loans from discharge in bankruptcy in all but the rarest instances, recognizing the problems (and costs) associated with allowing borrowers to wipe out defaulted debts through a bankruptcy filing. However, as the issues of access to college and affordability become frequent topics in political discourse, new ideas for radical changes to the treatment of student loan debt in bankruptcy have been proposed. Lenders and servicers need to be up to speed on those proposals and ready to adjust their operations if any become law.

On June 7, 2019, Judge Dennis Montali of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court of the Northern District of California San Francisco Division found that FERC’s finding that it had concurrent jurisdiction with the U.S. bankruptcy court over wholesale power agreements was “unenforceable in bankruptcy court and of no force on the parties before it.” Judge Montali further noted that if necessary, the U.S. bankruptcy court will “enjoin FERC from perpetuating its attempt to exercise power it wholly lacks.” At issue, on review by the bankruptcy court, was whether, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

Lenders and their counsel know that it is important to properly describe the collateral on which a lien (mortgage or security interest) is being granted. The purpose of this post is to discuss some recent decisions contrary to what many corporate counsel thought they knew concerning collateral descriptions in security agreements and UCC financing statements.