Although the Weil Bankruptcy Blog generally focuses on developments in the chapter 11 context, from time to time we cover cases outside of the bankruptcy world that may interest our readers. Among the challenges restructuring professionals frequently face are analyzing bond indentures, identifying parties’ respective rights to determine whether potential transactions are permissible, and invoking their clients’ rights to payment and other protections. As we have seen in the recent decisions in
On July 13, 2015, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued its decision in In re OAS S.A. et al.
On 28 January, the English High Court handed down the first ever judgment sanctioning a restructuring plan under Part 26A of the Companies Act 2006 (“CA 2006”) (“Plan”) invoking the new cross class cram down procedure introduced into UK law in June 2020.
Many businesses are—or soon will be—unable to meet their obligations. Not all businesses in distress are unsuccessful; sometimes, as in the economic circumstances arising from the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) and the governmental directives tailored to address the related public health issues, even successful businesses must confront closures and steep declines in demand that could not have been anticipated, and may find it necessary or desirable to restructure their existing debt obligations.
Whether a contract is executory is an often-litigated issue in bankruptcy because of the treatment afforded to such contracts. Although the Bankruptcy Code does not define the term “executory contract,” most courts follow a variation of the definition provided by Professor Vern Countryman in a 1973 law review article.
Among the many protections afforded creditors under the Bankruptcy Code is the estate’s ability to avoid transfers made before the petition date that benefit certain creditors at the expense of others. These so-called avoidance actions are primarily governed by Sections 544, 547 and 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, which set forth the requirements for challenging prepetition transfers as preferential or fraudulent.
Last week, in Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc.1 the Supreme Court settled a split in the circuit courts, unanimously holding that the safe harbor provision created by 11 U.S.C. § 546(e), 11 U.S.C.
The Second Circuit issued its much anticipated decision in Marblegate Asset Management LLC v. Education Management Corp., holding that “Section 316(b) prohibits only non-consensual amendments to an indenture’s core payment terms.” At issue is whether the phrase “right . . . to receive payment” forecloses “more than formal amendments to payment terms that eliminate the right to sue for payment.” The Second Circuit held that it does not.