The Bankruptcy Code’s cramdown provisions are a powerful tool for debtors in the plan confirmation process. Pursuant to section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code, a plan may be confirmed if, among other things, “at least one class of claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted the plan.” Once there is an impaired accepting class, and assuming certain requirements are met, the plan may then be “crammed down” on all other classes of impaired creditors that reject the plan and those creditors will be bound by the terms of a plan they rejected.

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On August 3, 2016, Delaware Trust Company, as trustee for the EFIH first lien notes, filed a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, asking the Court to review the Energy Future Holding debtors’ settlement with the EFIH first lien noteholders.

Plenty of ink has been spilled about how to apply the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Stern v. Marshall and the line of cases in which it sits. It is a challenging body of law for many reasons, but perhaps the most difficult reason is that the Court indicated that the scope of power that bankruptcy courts may be given today must be defined by reference to beliefs about the scope of judicial and other governmental powers at the time of the country’s founding, when divisions of governmental power were embedded in the U.S. Constitution.

Courts have applied various standards for determining when a “claim” arises for the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, particularly in the tort context. A recent decision from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania illustrates that the standard may differ depending on whether the claim in question is a creditor’s claim against the debtor’s estate or a debtor’s claim against a third-party.

While rockstars such as Iggy Pop and Nikki Sixx of Mötley Crüe were infamous for outlandish rider requests while on tour, perhaps nobody is more notorious for their demands of concert promoters than Van Halen.

Practitioners generally identify “excusable neglect” as the standard that bankruptcy courts apply in determining whether to allow a creditor’s untimely proof of claim. A creditor who lets the bar date pass finds itself in the undesirable position of having to persuade the bankruptcy court that its neglect to file a timely proof of claim was excusable.

“I’m inconsistent, even to myself.”

-Bob Dylan

The bankruptcy process is often long and arduous for clients, whether debtor or creditor, and their counsel.  Bankruptcy courts feel the pain, too.  So, when we finally reach the glorious goal of plan confirmation, most revel in the conclusion of the plan process.  Though often considered anathema, appeals of plan confirmation orders are sometimes pursued.  Recognizing the public policy desire for finality in bankruptcy proceedings, the Eighth Circuit applies the “person-aggrieved” doctrine in determining whether an appellant has standing to appeal a plan confirmation or

Section 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code affords debtors flexibility to sell assets outside of the ordinary course of business after notice and a hearing.  This right is supported by