Credit servicing firms, the Bankers' Book Evidence Acts 1879-1959 (“BBEA”), and the evidential requirements of an application for summary judgment were recently considered by the High Court in Promomtoria (Aran) Ltd v Burns. 1 The decision issued by Noonan J shows a practical use of Order 37 of the Rules of the Superior Courts in managing evidential requirements, where the BBEA cannot be utilised.

Background

The Land and Conveyancing Law Reform (Amendment) Bill 2019 (the “Bill”) proposes to broaden the factors that the courts can consider in refusing orders for possession sought by lenders.

The Bill has its roots in the Keeping People in their Homes Bill, 2018, introduced by Kevin “Boxer” Moran T.D., as a private member’s bill. However, the Bill does not go as far as Mr Moran’s bill and, for instance, does not require disclosure of the price paid by a purchaser of the loan.

Background

In a recent application for directions from the High Court, the Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement (the “ODCE”) brought a motion to compel a liquidator contest an appeal by directors of a restriction order made against them in the High Court.

Section 683 of the Companies Act 2014 (“CA14”) requires the liquidator of an insolvent company to apply for an Order restricting the directors. It does not require liquidator to contest an appeal by directors. The ODCE ultimately withdrew the application and paid costs, but the application raises concerns for all liquidators.

The High Court recently considered the scope of an interim examiner's powers in Re M.D.Y. Construction Ltd [2018] IEHC 676.

Binding actions by the Interim Examiner

Of interest to the High Court was the timeline within which certain actions were taken by the interim examiner appointed to M.D.Y. Construction Limited (the Company). Prior to confirmation of his appointment as examiner, the interim examiner entered into a binding investment agreement with a third party to fund proposals for a scheme of arrangement.

Bankruptcy law has always sought to strike a balance between the rights of creditors and debtors. In Ireland, bankruptcy and personal insolvency law has incurred seismic change over the past decade. Many of the legislative changes have been implemented from a policy basis of assisting the debtor. We look at recent developments, from the point of view of the petitioning creditor in any bankruptcy.

Automatic discharge from bankruptcy

Following the approach of the courts of England and Wales, the Supreme Court has stated unequivocally that it can no longer be said that the rules of equity are carved in stone, or are express immutable principles, unless changed by the Oireachtas.

In ACC Loan Management v Rickard, the defendant defaulted on a loan. ACC obtained judgment against him and then successfully applied to have a receiver appointed by way of equitable execution over payments which the defendant was due to receive from the Department of Agriculture under an EU farm payments scheme.

The appointment of a receiver by way of equitable execution has generally been considered a “remedy of last resort”[1] and, for over a hundred years, courts have expressed differing views as to when they could appoint such a receiver.

The default setting for the hearing of many contested debt recovery and security enforcement cases is by way of affidavit evidence, particularly in the High Court[1]. The creditor swears an affidavit setting out the reasons why it maintains the court should rule in its favour. Certain documents can be presented as exhibits that back up its case such as a contract.

It is now well documented that many owners’ management companies are facing the prospect of litigating to recover the cost of remedial works for defective developments or passing the cost onto the owners themselves. Given the passage of time since the construction of the developments and the insolvency of many of the developers and contractors involved in those projects following the financial crisis, management companies often face an uphill battle to recover damages.

In a recent judgement, the Supreme Court has upheld a High Court order for costs against a director of a number of companies (theCompanies) which were involved in proceedings with First Active plc (First Active), despite the fact that the director was not a party to the proceedings.

The Court took the view that the director (Mr Cunningham), who also owned or controlled the Companies, had funded the proceedings and should be held accountable for the costs.

Background to the order for costs