(6th Cir. B.A.P. May 11, 2016)

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reverses the bankruptcy court’s order allowing the unsecured creditor’s late-filed claim in this Chapter 13 case. The creditor filed its claim eight days after the bar date, and the bankruptcy court allowed the claim based on excusable neglect. The B.A.P. holds that a bankruptcy court does not have authority to extend the deadline in Rule 3002(c) through equitable powers or the doctrine of equitable tolling. Opinion below.

Judge: Humphrey

(6th Cir. Mar. 28, 2016)

The Sixth Circuit affirms the order granting summary judgment to the creditor, finding a debt nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). Summary judgment was appropriate because the debtor was collaterally estopped from defending against the fraud claim. The creditor had obtained a default judgment against the debtor, post-petition, in another court as a sanction. The court holds that the entry of the default judgment was not a violation of the automatic stay. Opinion below.

Judge: Boggs

Attorney for Debtor: Jonathan Rudman Bunn

(Bankr. S.D. Ind. Feb. 16, 2016)

(Bankr. E.D. Ky. Nov. 1, 2011)

(Bankr. S.D. Ind. Sep. 7, 2017)

The bankruptcy court enters judgment in favor of the debtor, granting a discharge in her bankruptcy case. The U.S. Trustee brought the action under § 727(a)(2)(B) and (a)(4)(A), alleging the debtor intentionally failed to disclose $5,000 she held in a lockbox on the petition date. The Court finds the debtor did not have the requisite intent and was unsure of what she was supposed to do at the 341 meeting based on a misunderstanding or miscommunication with her lawyer. Opinion below.

Judge: Carr

(6th Cir. July 14, 2017)

The Sixth Circuit affirms the bankruptcy court’s order granting the debtors’ motion to compel the Chapter 7 trustee to abandon their residential real property. The trustee sought to evict the debtors in order to sell the property and pay creditors. The trustee argued that because he tendered the homestead exemption payment to the debtors, eviction should be permitted. The debtors argued and presented evidence to establish that there was no equity for the estate considering the condition of the property. Opinion below.

Judge: Gilman

(6th Cir. April 28, 2017)

The Sixth Circuit affirms the district court and the bankruptcy court, holding that the sale of certain equity interests in the debtor to third parties was prohibited by the confirmed Chapter 11 plan. While the plan was silent as to such sales, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion when interpreting the plan and considering the intent of the parties based on the negotiations that resulted in the final confirmed plan. Opinion below.

Judge: Donald

(Bankr. W.D. Ky. Mar. 9, 2017)

The bankruptcy court grants summary judgment in favor of the creditor in this adversary proceeding in which the debtor alleged violations of the automatic stay and claims under the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act. The court holds that the creditor bank’s restriction of the debtor’s electronic privileges with respect to her accounts did not violate the automatic stay. Opinion below.

Judge: Stout

Attorney for Debtor: Ross Benjamin Neuhauser

Attorney for Creditor: Christopher M. Hill

The bankruptcy court enters judgment in favor of the debtor, dismissing claims under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) and § 727(a)(2)(A). The plaintiff argued that the debtor executed a scheme that intentionally injured the plaintiff because the debtor became unable to pay on promissory notes. The Court finds that the plaintiff did not establish that the debtor willfully and maliciously injured the plaintiff.

The Sixth Circuit affirms the 2015 consent order specifying the manner in which certain provisions of the confirmed Chapter 11 plan would apply to a class of claim holders. The Korean Claimants objected, arguing that the district court lacked authority to enter the consent order and that the consent order was an impermissible modification of the distribution agreement. The court holds that the court had the requisite authority to enter the consent order and it merely clarified the distribution agreement rather than modified it. Opinion below.

Judge: Kethledge