The Bottom Line

On January 25, 2010, the U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Peck struck down a provision that used the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (“LBHI”) to trigger subordination of a Lehman subsidiary’s swap claim against a securitization vehicle in the United Kingdom.1

On Jan. 19, 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated a bankruptcy court decision awarding Ultra Petroleum Corp. noteholders $201 million in make-whole payments and $186 million in post-petition interest. Under the note agreement, upon a bankruptcy filing, the issuer is obligated for a make-whole amount equal to the discounted value of the remaining scheduled payments (including principal and interest that would be due after prepayment) less the principal amount of the notes.

In the first article of this two-part series on sell-side opportunistic engineering in the CDS market, we surveyed a number of strategies that could be used by sellers of CDS protection to create sell-side gains. In this second part, we analyze two recent situations where a proposed refinancing dramatically affected the CDS market for the reference entity because of the reduction in the sell-side risk. Although these cases may or may not have been driven by CDS considerations, they illustrate how sell-side CDS strategies may be effectively implemented.

Over the past few years, the CDS market has seen an increase in activism and the evolution of creative refinancing and restructuring strategies intended to achieve particular outcomes in the CDS market.

Part 1 of this series described the recent decision of the ISDA Americas Determinations Committee to declare that a “failure to pay” had occurred with respect to iHeartCommunications Inc., notwithstanding that the only non-payment had been to a wholly owned subsidiary. The non-payment was orchestrated to avoid a springing lien that would have been triggered had all the notes of a particular issue of iHeartCommunications debt been paid in full. It did not reflect on the creditworthiness of iHeartCommunications.

On June 28, 2016, Judge Chapman of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled in Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. v. Bank of America National Association, et al.(Adv. Proc. No. 10-03547 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

On May 26, 2009, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and its affiliated U.S. chapter 11 debtors (“Lehman” or the “U.S. Debtors”) filed a motion (“Motion”) requesting the U.S. Bankruptcy Court (“Bankruptcy Court”) to set August 24, 2009 at 5:00 p.m. (ET) as the deadline for filing proofs of claim against the U.S. Debtors (the “Bar Date”). The Motion1 seeks entry of a proposed order (“Proposed Order”), that (i) establishes the Bar Date; (ii) approves the Proof of Claim Form; and (iii) approves the proposed notice procedures and form for the Bar Date notices.

In the first article of this two-part series on sell-side opportunistic engineering in the CDS market, we surveyed a number of strategies that could be used by sellers of CDS protection to create sell-side gains. In this second part, we analyze two recent situations where a proposed refinancing dramatically affected the CDS market for the reference entity because of the reduction in the sell-side risk. Although these cases may or may not have been driven by CDS considerations, they illustrate how sell-side CDS strategies may be effectively implemented.

Part 1 of this series described the recent decision of the ISDA Americas Determinations Committee to declare that a “failure to pay” had occurred with respect to iHeartCommunications Inc., notwithstanding that the only non-payment had been to a wholly owned subsidiary. The non-payment was orchestrated to avoid a springing lien that would have been triggered had all the notes of a particular issue of iHeartCommunications debt been paid in full. It did not reflect on the creditworthiness of iHeartCommunications.