Demonstrating what would most likely happen if a restructuring plan were not sanctioned is an essential element for the exercise of the court's discretion to cram down the votes of dissenting creditors

Restructuring plans under Part 26A of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006) may provide an alternative for companies in financial distress to formal insolvency (see our previous Insight).

“(b) Duties.—The [Subchapter V] trustee shall— . . . (7)facilitatethe development of a consensual plan of reorganization.”

• From 11 U.S.C § 1183(b)(7)(emphasis added).

Facilitation is, by statute, a duty of every Subchapter V trustee—something a Subchapter V trustee must do. But the nature and boundaries of the facilitation role have always been fuzzy and, therefore, misunderstood.

My purpose in this multi-part series is to provide observations on the facilitation role.

Restructuring plans can provide companies in the early stages of financial difficulty with a flexible alternative to entering a formal insolvency procedure

Under Part 26A of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006), companies or groups encountering financial difficulties affecting their ability to carry on business can propose a compromise or arrangement (a restructuring plan) which mitigates or eliminates the effects of those financial difficulties.

“Notwithstanding the court of appeals’ error, this case does not warrant this Court’s review.”

“(b) Duties.—The [Subchapter V] trustee shall— . . . (7)facilitatethe development of a consensual plan of reorganization.”

• From 11 U.S.C § 1183(b)(7)(emphasis added).

Facilitation is, by statute, a duty of every Subchapter V trustee—something a Subchapter V trustee must do. But the nature and boundaries of the facilitation role have always been fuzzy and, therefore, misunderstood.

My purpose in this multi-part series is to provide observations on the facilitation role.

“(b) Duties.—The [Subchapter V] trustee shall— . . . (7)facilitatethe development of a consensual plan of reorganization.”

• From 11 U.S.C § 1183(b)(7)(emphasis added).

Facilitation is, by statute, a duty of every Subchapter V trustee—something a Subchapter V trustee must do. But the nature and boundaries of the facilitation role have always been fuzzy and, therefore, misunderstood.

My purpose in this multi-part series is to provide observations on the facilitation role.

“Learn something new every day,” is a well-worn adage.

And it’s mostly true (I only question giving a literal meaning to the “every day” part).

Nevertheless, I’m embarrassed to acknowledge learning only recently of the existence of a noteworthy, bankruptcy-related statute: 28 U.S.C. § 959(a). Such statute reads in part (emphasis added):

Excluded from Subchapter V eligibility is a “single asset real estate” debtor.

We have a recent opinion on a Subchapter V debtor who beats that exclusion: In re Evergreen Site Holdings, Inc., [Fn. 1]

What follows is a summary of that opinion.

Eligibility Issue & Standards

The Evergreen issue is this:

In a mass-tort bankruptcy, when 95% of 120,000 creditors vote to accept a mediated plan paying over $7 billion to creditors, shouldn’t the plan be confirmed?

Subchapter V eligibility requires a debtor to be “engaged in” commercial/business activities.

Case Law Consensus

Case law consensus is that such activities must exist on the petition filing date. That means a debtor cannot utilize Subchapter V when:

• business assets are fully-liquidated;
• unpaid debts are the only remnant of the failed business; and
• prospects for resuming such activities are nil.

So . . . here’s the question: Is that the right eligibility standard?

I say, “No.”

A Hypothetical