The High Court has reiterated that cross-examination will not generally be permitted on an interlocutory application, or where there is no conflict of fact on the affidavits.
In McCarthy v Murphy,[1] the defendant mortgagor was not permitted to cross-examine the plaintiff (a receiver) or a bank employee who swore a supporting affidavit.
Background
There is little doubt that even the most thought-out, meticulous and well-structured business rescue plan cannot succeed unless there is some degree of financial support in the form of post-commencement finance (PCF) available, to allow the business to sail through the choppy waters of financial distress.
Two recent judgments have brought further clarity in relation to the rights acquirers of loan portfolios to enforce against borrowers:
In Umso Construction (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Roads and Public Works Eastern Cape Province and Others ((20800/2014) [2016] ZASCA 61), the Supreme Court of Appeal considered the legal position where, following the award of a tender, it is discovered that the preferred bidder had been placed under business rescue during the bid evaluation process.
In AIB Mortgage Bank -v- O'Toole & anor [2016] IEHC 368 the High Court determined that a bank was not prevented from relying on a mortgage as security for all sums due by the defendants, despite issuing a redemption statement which omitted this fact.
In order to understand this case, it is necessary to set out the chronology of events:
In Roering & Another NNO v Mahlangu (581/2015) [2016] ZASCA 79 heard recently, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) considered the circumstances that might justify a witness under subpoena applying for enquiry proceedings to be set aside or for the witness to be excused from attending those proceedings.
The general rule is that a subpoenaed witness is compelled to attend, subject to procedural requirements being met, and the evidence sought being relevant to the insolvent company or entity.
In early 2016, the Government commissioned an examination into laws protecting employees following the overnight closure of the historic Clerys department store in Dublin in June 2015, with the immediate loss of 460 jobs. We review the recently published report which sets out six key proposals for legislative reform.
In the recent case of Constantia Insurance Company Limited v Master of the High Court, Johannesburg (23968/2015) [2016] ZAGPJHC 121 the High Court considered whether the provisions of the Insolvency Act, No 24 of 1936 (Act) permit the Master to consider liquidators’ additional submissions in response to a creditor’s substantiation of its claim.
The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in Swart v Starbuck & Others 2016 ZASCA 83, reaffirmed the necessary authorisation for a trustee of an insolvent estate to sell an insolvent estate’s immovable property.
Mr Swart’s estate was finally sequestrated on 1 November 2005. On 24 January 2006, three provisional trustees were appointed by the Master of the High Court. At the time of Mr Swart’s provisional sequestration, he owned certain immovable properties (Properties).
Facility agreements ordinarily oblige a borrower to prepay the facility on the occurrence of certain events, including, if a borrower receives insurance proceeds or asset sale proceeds during the loan term. The rationale for this is that lenders wish to use this unexpected windfall to mitigate the risk of non-payment. This is also the approach of the Loan Market Association (LMA) in its standard facility agreements.