In the first three months of 2021, almost 40,000 companies were struck off the Companies House register – an increase of 743% on the same period in 2020. Speculation that these figures related to avoidance of coronavirus-related loan repayments led the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy to take the highly unusual step, in March 2021, of making a blanket objection to any application for dissolution by a company with an unpaid bounce-back loan.

In FCA v Carillion [2021] EWCH 2871 (Ch), the High Court has confirmed that Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) enforcement action against Carillion Plc (in Liquidation) (Carillion) pursuant to certain provisions of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) does not constitute an “action or proceeding” and therefore falls outside of the scope of the statutory stay imposed by section 130(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (the Act).

Section 130(2) of the Act

A recent Court of Appeal decision has criticised obiter comments made by the Supreme Court in Bresco v Lonsdale to the effect that adjudication decisions in favour of companies in liquidation could in certain circumstances, and with appropriate safeguards, be enforced by way of summary judgment. The Court of Appeal has indicated that such an approach would be at odds with the mandatory right of set-off arising under the Insolvency Rules. The Court of Appeal’s comments in this respect are themselves obiter and will give rise to uncertainty in this area of the law.

A significant rise in criminal prosecutions of company directors indicates that the Insolvency Service is raising the stakes when it comes to pursuing the most egregious cases of wrongdoing. While typically the sanctions for a rogue director would be limited to disqualification proceedings, a small but growing number of directors are finding themselves facing criminal prosecution as a result of Insolvency Service action - with 122 convictions in the year to 30 September, compared to just 40 in the same period for the previous year.

As the UK emerges from the COVID-19 pandemic, the domestic construction industry can look forward to a bright but challenging future. Mortgages are at record lows; housing demand remains high and the wider economy is in optimistic mood. However, businesses are experiencing challenges associated with sourcing raw materials, staff shortages and the prospect that more companies will likely fail as government business support measures tail off.

Recent analysis by Begbies Traynor shows that more than half of UK businesses are carrying “toxic debt” that they might struggle to repay over the next 12 months. What if the company you are thinking of suing, or that is suing you, is one of them?

A bill currently making its way through parliament is intended to enable increased scrutiny of the actions of directors of dissolved companies – and discourage the abuse of the voluntary strike-off procedure as an ‘alternative’ to insolvency proceedings. The measures relating to dissolved companies in the Rating (Coronavirus) and Directors Disqualification (Dissolved Companies) Bill (the “Bill”) have been contemplated for some time, originally raised in the government’s consultation on insolvency and corporate governance in 2018 (the “2018 Consultation”).

Monthly insolvency statistics released by the Insolvency Service indicate that company insolvencies are beginning to return to pre-pandemic levels - a trend which will no doubt be intensified by the partial relaxation of restrictions on winding up petitions at the end of September.

Following the recent surge in wholesale energy prices, we are seeing increasing numbers of energy supplier insolvency in the news and customers are finding themselves transferred to new providers.

The High Court has set out the principles that apply to the construction of questions in an insurer’s automated online underwriting system and the circumstances in which an insurer’s questions may lead to waiver of the right to be told about certain information. In this case, the Court considered the construction and scope of the insurer’s standard question concerning previous insolvencies, and held that the wording used waived the insurer’s right to be told about other insolvency events not caught by the question.

Background