The government has responded to intense pressure from the restructuring and insolvency community by announcing measures to 'protect companies hit by COVID-19'. Insolvency law will be amended 'to give companies breathing space and keep trading while they explore options for rescue'.

RAAs are a statutory restructuring mechanism which operate by apportioning the departing employer’s share of liability between it and remaining employers. As an RAA can be entered before the insolvency process is initiated, RAAs can permit corporate restructuring in response to financial hardship without triggering the departing employer’s insolvency.

On top of the multiple challenges hitting retail and leisure landlords and occupiers arising from COVID-19, the news that Intu has had to write down the value of its shopping centre portfolio by nearly £2 billion came as further bad news.

It seems that business disruption due to coronavirus is pretty inevitable. What should you as a company director be doing if the disruption means your business starts to suffer?

What changes for me as a director?

As a director, you know that you owe duties to the company. When the business starts heading towards insolvency, there is a change of emphasis and instead of doing what is best for the shareholders, you have to change and consider what the consequences of your actions will be for the company’s creditors.

2019 was for many a year of waiting…we waited, and waited and indeed still wait…for Brexit. That inevitably has had an impact on the property world and in particular the investment market experiencing a degree of inactivity. Somewhat ironically though Brexit has given us one of several important decisions in 2019 relevant to the Real Estate Disputes world.

Against the backdrop of the insolvency of Scottish companies carrying on business in India, a recent decision of the Inner House of the Court of Session has considered the competency of seeking declaratory orders in petition procedure.

Background

In October 2016, we reported on a Court of Session decision which concerned three Scottish registered companies carrying on business in India and which had been placed into administration under the Insolvency Act 1986.

Can a Creditors Voluntary Arrangement (CVA) lead to a stay in the enforcement of an adjudicator’s decision?

In January of this year the Court of Appeal refused to stay enforcement of an adjudication award due to a CVA ((1838) Cannon Corporate Limited v Primus Build Limited [2019] EWCA Civ 27). Four months later another enforcement decision against a company subject to a CVA came before the Technology and Construction Court (TCC). This time a stay was granted – so what was the difference?

In BTI 2014 LLC v. Sequana SA & Ors [2019], the Court of Appeal upheld the High Court decision that dividends can be challenged as transactions defrauding creditors under the Insolvency Act 1986.

In BTI 2014 LLC v. Sequana SA & Others [2019], the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the High Court that dividends can be challenged as transactions defrauding creditors under section 423 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (the '1986 Act').

The first instance decision:

A party on the receiving end of an adjudication is usually in a difficult position. Its situation is only made worse if the referring party is insolvent.

In such a situation, if the adjudicator makes an award in favour of the insolvent company the chances of subsequently recovering any sums awarded in litigation are very limited. While a stay to enforcement may be available, there are costs associated with obtaining a stay which will probably also be irrecoverable.

A trustee in bankruptcy lost all rights to the proceeds of sale of a freehold property after he disclaimed title to it

Background

Mr Sleight was the trustee in bankruptcy of an insolvent estate. The deceased’s assets included several freehold properties that were charged to banks where the value of the property was less than the amounts due under the charges. Given the negative equity, the trustee in bankruptcy disclaimed title to these properties as they constituted “onerous property”.