Section 154 of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 (Act) provides that a business rescue plan (BR plan) may provide that a creditor, who has acceded to the discharge of the whole or part of a debt owing to that creditor, will lose the right to enforce the debt or part of it. Furthermore, if a BR plan has been approved and implemented, a creditor is not entitled to enforce any debt owed by the company immediately before the beginning of the business rescue process, except to the extent provided for in the BR plan.
The legal principles relating to execution against movable property are more or less settled, less so the law relating to execution against immovable property. This is mainly because the right to housing is enshrined in s26 of the Constitution and the issue of land has become somewhat emotive and politicised in the recent past.
Introduction
The UNCITRAL Model Law on the Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency Related Judgments (‘the New Model Law’) is intended to fill the gaps that currently exist in cross-border conventions as they apply to the recognition and enforcement of judgments in insolvency proceedings.
Khandanpour v Chambers [2019] EWCA Civ 570
Should relief from sanctions be granted where a judgment debtor purports to appropriate monies paid to satisfying a procedural condition for setting aside a default costs order, but the creditor purports to appropriate the monies instead to the judgment debt?
Background
In many, if not all, commercial transactions, timing is everything, either for a distressed seller or a purchaser stumbling upon a deal that may almost be too good to be true. There is often no time to waste and a deal must be closed as soon as possible. In the haste of closing a deal, whether in the form of a sale of business or a sale of assets, the parties often agree not to comply with the provisions of s34(1) of the Insolvency Act, No 24 of 1936 (Act), each willing to take the risk in not doing so.
Section 34(1) of the Act provides that:
How deep is the “pool of facts in which it is permissible to fish for the basis of the new cause of action” if a party wishes to benefit from the ‘relation back’ doctrine when calculating limitation periods? The Court of Appeal gives guidance on the meaning of “the same or substantially the same facts” for the purpose of CPR r 17.4(2).
It is trite that the purpose of business rescue proceedings is to rehabilitate companies that have fallen on hard times, with a hope of either rescuing them or to provide a better return to creditors than what they would receive on a liquidation. This was reiterated in the recent Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) judgment of Van Staden and Others NNO v Pro-Wiz (Pty) Ltd (412/2018) [2019] ZASCA 7 (8 March 2019).
With the Court of Appeal’s decision in Bresco Electrical Services Ltd v Michael J Lonsdale (Electrical) Ltd just a few weeks old, it is hardly surprising that people are looking again at the relationship between insolvency law and adjudication, noting that in cases of liquidation where parties have a cross claim, construction law defers to insolvency law.
This was clearly illustrated in Gregg Nowak Ltd v CSS Electrical Distributors Ltd, which came before HHJ Bailey earlier this month.
Background
This was a conjoined appeal alongside Bresco v Lonsdale. In this case, Cannon and Primus had already participated in an adjudication, with the decision of the adjudicator favouring Primus. Primus would later enter into a Company Voluntary Arrangement.
The CVA was made on the basis that, although Primus was insolvent at the time, it would be able to satisfy its creditors if it were able to recover from Cannon and other third parties through litigation and adjudication. This was preferable to liquidation.