Judge Barber has considered the order of priority of payments in an administration and - more specifically - whether the Lundy Granite principle applies to both the rent payable once a company has gone into administration, and to the “top up” obligation requiring the company to replenish a rent deposit, where a landlord had drawn down on the deposit against unpaid rent (Re London Bridge Entertainment Partners LLP (in administration) [2019] EWHC 2932 (CH)).

The Rules

In this week’s update: The court finds that selfdealing by a director and a share buyback were void, the PERG report on compliance with the Walker Guidelines, the BVCA and EY review private equity portfolio company performance, the QCA reports on AIM company corporate governance and a few other items. 

Court confirms self-dealing by director was void

Being involved with a company which is experiencing financial difficulties is clearly a stressful experience for directors. As well as having to deal with the operational consequences of the company’s distress, directors must ensure that they comply with their duties and obligations under the Companies Act 2006 (CA2006) and the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA1986). Directors of listed entities are in a particularly difficult position, as in addition to those duties they must comply with their obligations to the markets.

Directors’ duties

Background

The aim of the compensation order regime, to make directors financially account for the consequences of their unfit conduct, applies to directors’ conduct after 1 October 2015 and gives the Secretary of State (“SoS”) the power to apply for a compensation order against a director who is either subject to a disqualification order or who has given a disqualification undertaking and the conduct of that person has caused loss to one or more creditors of the insolvent company.

A recent TCC decision has provided further guidance on a liquidator’s options when seeking payments owed to insolvent companies through adjudication and the interplay with the Insolvency Rules. The decision establishes an exception to the general principle that such adjudication proceedings will not be enforced (and are liable to be injuncted) where the responding party has a cross-claim.

Following an expedited trial, the High Court has rejected an application brought by a group of landlords known as the Combined Property Control Group (“CPC”) to challenge the company voluntary arrangement (“CVA”) proposed by Debenhams Retail Limited (“Debenhams”).

CPC challenged the CVA on five grounds. The judge in the case, Mr Justice Norris, held that four of the five grounds failed and directed certain “Forfeiture Restraint Provisions” be removed from the CVA as a result of the fifth.

The CVA challenge

The landlords’ claim against the Debenhams CVA was put forward on five grounds:

1. Future rent is not a “debt” and so the landlords are not creditors, such that the CVA cannot bind them

REJECTED: The definition of “debt” is broad enough to include pecuniary contingent liabilities, such as future rent.

2. A CVA cannot operate to reduce rent payable under leases: it is automatically unfairly prejudicial

In this week's update: directors did not need to consider the rights of creditors when declaring a dividend as the company was not insolvent, the Law Commission is seeking views on the law of intermediated securities, polling information can be inside information and a couple of other items.

Court considers whether demerger by dividend was valid (part 4)

In this week's update: a distribution was valid despite discrepancies in the accounts justifying the dividend and an examination of vexatious resolutions.

Court considers whether demerger by dividend was valid (part 2)

In this week's update: directors implementing a management buy-out did not owe fiduciary duties to the other shareholders and a distribution was valid despite the relevant accounts not being in the usual format.

Directors did not owe fiduciary duty to shareholders

The High Court has held that the directors of a company did not owe a fiduciary duty to the company’s shareholders when implementing a management buy-out (MBO).

What happened?