In the English High Court, the joint administrators of four English companies within the former Lehman Brothers group sought directions from the Court in respect of a proposed settlement. The settlement would put to rest substantial inter-company claims including those at issue in the 'Waterfall III' proceedings.

In a second application heard on the same day, Hildyard J considered an application by the administrators of Lehman Brothers Europe Limited (LBEL) for directions that would enable a surplus to be distributed to the sole member of LBEL while LBEL remained in administration. The proposed scheme had material benefits for both shareholders and creditors. The administrators acknowledged that the orders sought were an indirect means of circumventing the Insolvency Act 1986 (UK), which does not expressly provide for directors to make distributions during an administration.

On 1 October 2017, the Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims (Protocol) will come into force. It will apply to all debt claims where:

• the creditor is a business (including sole traders and public bodies)
• the debtor is an individual (including sole traders), and
• no other specialised Protocol applies.

Why is this new Protocol being introduced?

The express purpose of the new Protocol is to:

Breyer Group Plc v RBK Engineering Ltd

The High Court's recent judgment in Breyer Group Plc v RBK Engineering Limited [2017] EWHC 1206 provides a timely reminder for parties to construction contracts of the appropriate (and inappropriate) uses of winding-up petitions.

The case concerned a successful application made by Breyer Group PLC (Breyer) for an order preventing RBK Engineering Limited (RBK) from continuing with a petition to wind up Breyer on the basis of a disputed debt.

How did the dispute arise?

In summary:

The Court of Appeal has recently dismissed an appeal from the High Court's judgment (discussed in our September 2016 update) setting aside a compromise under Part 14 of the Companies Act 1993 after finding that the challenging creditors, who had voted against the compromise, had been unfairly prejudiced by the decision to call only one meeting of creditors.

In Randhawa and Randhawa v Turpin and Hardy [2017] the Court of Appeal considered the comparatively simple question of whether the sole director of a company with articles that required two directors for a board meeting to be quorate, could validly appoint administrators under paragraph 22(2) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986 (paragraph 22(2)). The complicating feature was that, whilst 75% of the shares in the company were held by the sole director, the remaining 25% were registered in the name of a long-dissolved Manx company.

Background

In McIntosh v Fisk [2017] NZSC 78, the New Zealand Supreme Court had to consider whether the liquidators of a Ponzi scheme were entitled to recover from an investor a payment that the investor had received shortly before the appointment of the liquidators.

The case of Singularis Holdings Ltd v Daiwa Capital Markets Europe Ltd [2017] EWHC 257 (Ch) concerned the liability of a stockbroking company for failing to investigate fraudulent transactions. 

In Akers & Ors v Samba Financial Group (Rev 1) [2017] UKSC 6, the UK Supreme Court confirmed that British insolvency officers can only void dispositions of a company's assets held on trust in certain circumstances. 

The Supreme Court in McIntosh v Fisk upheld the Court of Appeal decision permitting the liquidators of Ross Asset Management Ltd (RAM) to claw back the fictitious profits paid out to Mr McIntosh.  However the claw back did not apply to the original investment of $500,000.

The majority found that McIntosh had a defence for the $500,000 as he had provided "real and substantial valuable consideration".  Once RAM misappropriated the $500,000 it became indebted to McIntosh for that amount, this equated to the provision of valuable consideration.