Deep Purple was, and still is, a rock music band. Its members included Mr Gillan, Mr Glover and Mr Paice. In 2005, band members entered into an agreement with HEC Enterprises Limited (HEC) and Deep Purple (Overseas) Limited (DPO). Under that agreement, the parties agreed to form a new company named Purpletuity, to which various copyrights and other assets were to be transferred. In 2015, Mr Gillan, Mr Glover and Mr Paice commenced proceedings against HEC and DPO to enforce that agreement.
In Mclean v Trustees of the Bankruptcy Estate of Dent [2016] EWHC 2650, the High Court considered the application of the equitable doctrines of marshalling and subrogation in relation to a fixed charge over (among other things) a dog.
A company and partnership borrowed funds from two sources – Barclays Bank and Lady Morrison. Barclays held, among other things, charges over farms owned by individual partners and an agricultural charge under the Agricultural Credits Act 1928 (UK), including a charge over a dog. Lady Morrison only held charges over the farms.
In Day v The Official Assignee as Liquidator of GN Networks Ltd (in Liq) [2016] NZHC 2400, the High Court rejected a claim that the funding arrangement at issue constituted maintenance or champerty.
Accept an unpalatable offer, or reject it and risk getting much less (or even nothing)? This is the choice stakeholders in chapter 11 bankruptcies increasingly face as a result of the proliferation of “deathtrap” provisions in plans of reorganization. For example, a class of bondholders may be forced to decide between accepting 60 cents on the dollar if they vote to accept a plan, or 40 cents if they reject. A class of equityholders may have to decide between accepting equity warrants, or rejecting and getting nothing.
In our June 2016 update, we discussed the Court of Appeal's decisions in Madsen-Ries v Petera[2016] NZCA 103, Calvert v Reynolds [2016] NZCA 151, and Petterson v Browne [2016] NZCA 189. In all three cases leave was sought to appeal to the Supreme Court. Leave was granted to the applicant companies in Petterson v Browne, but declined in all other cases. 
In the recent High Court case of McKay v Johnson & Smith [2016] NZHC 1691, a liquidator, Geoff Martin Smith, allegedly sent a notice under s 305 of the Companies Act 1993 to the bank that had security over a company in liquidation. The bank did not respond to the notice and Mr Smith alleged that the bank had lost its security. The bank maintained it never received the notice.
The Court was satisfied that the notice had been fabricated because:
In Advicewise People Ltd v Trends Publishing International Ltd, four creditors of Trends Publishing International Ltd (Trends) successfully challenged a compromise approved under Part 14 of the Companies Act 1993.
The High Court's ruling in Priest v Ross Asset Management Ltd (In Liq) [2016] NZHC 1803 arose out of the devastation of the Ponzi scheme effected by David Ross of Ross Asset Management Limited (In Liquidation) (RAM) and Dagger Nominees Limited (Dagger). For many years RAM and Dagger reported spectacular returns for investors before their illusion was revealed, the Financial Markets Authority became involved and liquidators were appointed.
In Petterson v Hutt a liquidator sought an interim injunction preventing any enforcement steps being taken under two general security agreements (GSAs). In the substantive proceeding, the liquidator sought to have the GSAs set aside.
In Madsen-Ries & Anor v Donovan Drainage and Earthmoving Limited [2016] NZCA 301, the liquidators of a failed property development company, Te Pua, applied to set aside as insolvent transactions a number of payments which Te Pua made to a drainage contractor, Donovan.