Currently before the Supreme Court is Baker Botts, L.L.P. v. ASARCO, L.L.C.,2 in which the Court will determine whether bankruptcy judges have discretion to award compensation for the defense of a fee application under 11 U.S.C. § 330(a). The decision in Baker Botts will likely resolve a circuit split and make clear whether a defense of a fee application is necessary to the administration of the case and, therefore, compensable.
On June 6, 2014, Justice Brown of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) released additional reasons1 to his decision in Romspen Investment Corp. v. 6711162 Canada Inc., 2014 ONSC 2781, centred on the cost submissions made by counsel to Romspen Investment Corp. (“Romspen”). Despite a contractual provision in a mortgage agreement that gave the applicant, Romspen, a right to full indemnity costs from the respondents, Justice Brown found that the legal fees incurred by counsel to Romspen were unreasonable.
Factoring is a common way for businesses to monetize current assets. Typically, in a factoring transaction, an enterprise sells its accounts receivable to a third party (commonly a bank, but not always), which, in exchange for a discount on the value of the receivables, takes on the effort and time commitment related to collecting the accounts.
The recent decision by the Court of Appeal for Ontario (the “Court”) in 306440 Ontario Ltd. v. 782127 Ontario Ltd.1 serves as a cautionary reminder to secured creditors that their position may not always be at the top of the insolvency food chain, even when they have taken all the proper steps to perfect their security interests.
Following the Eleventh Circuit’s decision last year in Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, the filing of a proof of claim on a time-barred debt in a bankruptcy case pending in the Eleventh Circuit’s jurisdiction violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p (“FDCPA”). But as the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Alabama recently made clear in Gurganus v. Recovery Management Systems Corp. (In re Gurganus), No. 7:14-ap-70054-BGC, 2015 WL 65089 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Jan.
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has agreed to hear Bullard v. Hyde Park Savings Bank (In re Bullard), U.S., No. 14-116 (cert. granted 12/12/14). The Court's decision in this case will resolve a circuit split with regard to whether an order denying confirmation of a bankruptcy plan is a final order appealable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1). The decision has the potential to impact Chapter 13 and Chapter 11 cases.
On December 1, 2014, the Court of Appeal for Ontario (the “Court of Appeal”) released its decision, written for the Court of Appeal by Madam Justice Pepall, in Bank of Nova Scotia v. Diemer, 2014 ONCA 851 (“Diemer”). The Court of Appeal dismissed the court-appointed receiver’s (the “Receiver”) appeal of the order of Justice Goodman, which, among other things, reduced the fees of counsel (“Counsel”) to the Receiver.
Section 1322(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code1 allows debtors to cure defaults and reinstate a
mortgage on their principal residence "until such residence is sold at a foreclosure sale that is
conducted in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law."2
Like many provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code, this one appears fairly straightforward at first glance; a debtor has the right to
cure and reinstate a home mortgage until the property is sold at a foreclosure sale.
Bankruptcy and insolvency professionals should take note of two recent Ontario Superior Court decisions that put professional fees in the spotlight. TNG Acquisition Inc. (Re), 2014 ONSC 2754 [Commercial List] (“TNG Acquisition”) and Bank of Nova Scotia v. Diemer, 2014 ONSC 365 (“Diemer”), saw Brown J. and Goodman J., respectively, reduce fees for court-appointed officers and their legal counsel on the basis that the amounts sought were unreasonable in consideration of the work performed.
Who Will Think of the Tenants: Split in Authority Regarding the Interplay Between Bankruptcy Code Sections 363(f) and 365(h)(1)(A)