(Bankr. W.D. Ky. Dec. 22, 2016)

(7th Cir. Dec. 21, 2016)

The Seventh Circuit affirms the bankruptcy court’s judgment that certain real property of the debtor was exempt because it was held in a tenancy by the entirety under Illinois law. The creditor argued that the tenancy by the entirety was severed when the real property had been transferred to a trust prepetition. The Seventh Circuit examines applicable Illinois statutes and concludes that the transfer did not sever the tenancy by the entirety. Opinion below

Judge: Posner

Attorney for Debtor: Kofkin Law, Scott J. Kofkin

On November 21, 2016, in a case entitled In re Monson,1 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's decision,2 which held that a debtor's conduct constituted a willful and malicious injury to a creditor within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6), because the debtor injured the creditor's right to recover its loan, the injury was intended, and the debtor was conscious of his wrongdoing. Thus, the debt was nondischargeable under 523(a)(6).

Exceptions to the Dischargeability of Debt under Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code

(Bankr. E.D. Ky. Dec. 6, 2016)

(Bankr. E.D. Ky. Nov. 28, 2016)

The bankruptcy court enters summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in this 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) nondischargeability action. The plaintiffs had obtained a state court default judgment against the debtor for damages caused to them when the debtor drove to their home and shot one of the plaintiffs and injured the other plaintiff with flying debris. The court holds that collateral estoppel bars the debtor from relitigating the issue of whether the debtor caused a willful and malicious injury to the plaintiffs. Opinion below.

Judge: Wise

(6th Cir. B.A.P. Nov. 29, 2016)

(Bankr. W.D. Ky. Dec. 1, 2016)

Following trial, the bankruptcy court excepts from discharge a debt arising from a loan, but holds the plaintiff failed to meet its burden with respect to other debts. The court also finds that a lien was not created where there was no proof of an actual levy, but a seperate judgment lien is held valid. The court denies the debtor’s motion to avoid the lien. Opinion below.

Judge: Stout

Attorneys for Plaintiff: Thomas, Arvin & Adams, James G. Adams, III, David E. Arvin

(Bankr. E.D. Ky. Nov. 22, 2016)

The bankruptcy court grants the creditor’s motion to modify the stay to allow the creditor to proceed with the state court real property foreclosure action. The court finds that cause exists for stay relief for reasons including that this second bankruptcy filing by the debtor was pending for three months, the debtor’s plan depended on a sale of the property, the debtor had not taken any action to proceed with the sale, and there was no proof that the debtor’s spouse (co-owner of the property) would consent to the sale. Opinion below.

The Bankruptcy Code gives a trustee the power to avoid pre-petition fraudulent and preference transfers made by a debtor, except that a trustee may not avoid a transfer that is "made by or to (or for the benefit of)" a party enumerated in 546(e) of the Code "in connection with a securities contract." Although 546(e) has been applied in various circumstances, there is little court guidance on whether 546(e) protects transfers made to repay commercial mortgage-backed securities ("CMBS") loans. One case in particular has applied 546(e) to dismiss such an avoidance action: Krol v.

The Sixth Circuit affirms the 2015 consent order specifying the manner in which certain provisions of the confirmed Chapter 11 plan would apply to a class of claim holders. The Korean Claimants objected, arguing that the district court lacked authority to enter the consent order and that the consent order was an impermissible modification of the distribution agreement. The court holds that the court had the requisite authority to enter the consent order and it merely clarified the distribution agreement rather than modified it. Opinion below.

Judge: Kethledge