Introduction

The recent decision of Andrew Burrows QC, sitting as a Judge of the High Court, in Palliser Limited v Fate Limited (In Liquidation) [2019] EWHC 43 (QB), is a useful reminder of the difficulties that can arise where one party (here a tenant) relies on another (its landlord) to take out insurance.

The Facts

In 2010, a fire started at the ground floor restaurant owned and operated by a company called Fate Limited (“Fate”). It was not in dispute that the fire was caused by Fate’s negligence.

Re SHB Realisation Ltd (formerly BHS Ltd); Wright and another (as joint liquidators of SHB Realisations Ltd (formerly BHS Ltd)) v Prudential Assurance Companies Ltd [2018] EWHC 402 (Ch); [2018] All ER (D) 58 (Mar)

Synopsis

In a case of first impression, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that a debtor who successfully challenges — as opposed to a debtor who defends — an award of attorney’s fees and costs for violations of the automatic stay under § 362(k) of the Bankruptcy Code is entitled to an award of appellate fees and costs.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently affirmed the dismissal of a consumer’s complaint alleging that a collection letter violated the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692, et seq., by failing to meaningfully convey the name of his creditor, as required.

The Supreme Court of Ohio recently held that a mortgagee may enforce a mortgage against a mortgagor who signed, initialed, and acknowledged the mortgage even though the body of the mortgage agreement does not identify the mortgagor by name.

In so ruling, the Supreme Court of Ohio allowed a mortgagee to use parole evidence to determine the mortgage signatory’s intent where there is an ambiguity.

Daniel Gatty discusses the recent High Court ruling in Leon v Her Majesty’s Attorney General and others [2018] EWHC 3026 (Ch) and its impact on the grant of vesting orders following the disclaimer of a lease.

Readers of this column will be aware of the complications that can ensue when a lease is disclaimed by a tenant’s liquidator under section 178 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986), by a tenant’s trustee in bankruptcy under section 315 of the IA 1986 or by the Crown under section 1013 of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006) following dissolution of a tenant company.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently held that a mortgage loan with a post-plan maturity date was not discharged in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy because the plan did not “provide for” the debt and modify the repayment terms of the mortgage.

The Eleventh Circuit also held that the debt was not discharged because discharge would violate 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2)’s anti-modification provision for mortgages secured by the debtor’s principal residence.

This is the third occasion on which I have posted on this blog on the issue of after the event insurance (ATE) policies and the impact which they have on applications for security for costs.

In the first post on 16 November 2017, I praised the judgment of Snowden J in Premier Motorauctions v Pricewaterhouse Coopers for appearing to bring clarity to an area which had for some time struggled with near irreconcilable decisions.

• A bankruptcy court in Ohio recently applied the incorrect statute of limitations in a mortgage foreclosure action.
• Ohio’s statute of limitations jurisprudence has evolved from an accepted legal proposition derived from one opinion to supposedly well-settled law stating the complete opposite in another opinion.
• Federal courts interpreting Ohio law must apply the correct statute of limitations to mortgage foreclosure actions.

In the bankruptcy case of In re Fisher, 584 B.R. 185, 199–200 (N.D. Ohio Bankr.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently rejected an attempt by homeowners to collaterally attack a state court mortgage foreclosure judgment, affirming the trial court’s dismissal of an amended complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim, but on alternative grounds.