The District of Columbia Court of Appeals recently held that a condominium association acting on its six-month super-priority lien for unpaid condominium assessments pursuant to § 42-1903.13(a)(2) of the District of Columbia Condominium Act (the “D.C. Condo Act”) may not conduct its foreclosure sale subject to a first deed of trust lien, even if the terms of sale stated that the condo unit would be sold subject to first deed of trust.

In an action against a Florida consumer plaintiffs’ firm that also functions as consumer bankruptcy debtors’ counsel, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently held that a bankruptcy attorney violates section 526(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code if he instructs a client to pay his legal fees using a credit card.

In so ruling, the Court held that there is no requirement under the statute that the advice be given for an invalid purpose designed to manipulate the bankruptcy process.

The Supreme Court of Florida recently denied a pro se borrower’s petition to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court, and imposed sanctions against him for filing numerous meritless and inappropriate petitions for relief pertaining to trial court foreclosure proceedings to which he is a defendant.

In so doing, the Supreme Court barred the borrower from filing any future pleadings, motions or requests for relief in the Supreme Court related to his foreclosure proceedings, unless filed in good faith by an attorney in good standing.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently held that a completely unsecured lien may be stripped off in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding under 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) even though a proof of claim has not been filed.

A copy of the opinion in Edwin Burkhart v. Nancy Spencer Grigsby is available at: Link to Opinion.

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Sixth Circuit recently held that the constructive notice provisions of section 1301.401 of the Ohio Revised Code do not limit a bankruptcy trustee’s avoidance powers as a hypothetical judgment lien creditor under section 544(a)(1) of the federal Bankruptcy Code.

A copy of the opinion is available at:  Link to Opinion.

Reversing the rulings of both the appellate and the trial courts, the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois recently held that the deadline to file a motion to quash service under the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law (IMFL) did not run while the foreclosure action was dismissed for want of prosecution.

A copy of the opinion is available at:  Link to Opinion.

Back in October 2017, the Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims (“PAP”) was launched to very little fanfare. PAP is part of the Civil Procedure Rules which govern how parties deal with litigation claims through the County Court and is the first time that strict rules have been put in place for pre-action conduct on a debt matter. I wrote an article about PAP at the time to explain the ins and outs of it.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar the trial court from considering the plaintiff’s claims because she was not challenging or seeking to set aside an underlying non-judicial mortgage foreclosure proceeding under Colorado law.

Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit remanded to the trial court to determine what effect, if any, the non-judicial proceeding had under the doctrines of issue and claim preclusion.

Much has already been said about the demise of Carillion and the impact of its liquidation on the various parties with whom it contracted. In this article, I would like to examine what light the demise of Carillion throws on themes commonly encountered within insolvency and whether there are lessons to be learned for everyone.

Having read the various reports in the press, it is clear that whilst Carillion entered into multi-billion pound government contracts, the contracts had extremely small profit margins, ultimately rendering the business unsustainable.

The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, recently dismissed a mortgagee’s “breach of mortgage contract” action as an impermissible second refiling following prior voluntary dismissals of a 2011 foreclosure complaint and 2013 action for breach of the promissory note based upon the same note and mortgage.