The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently affirmed a bankruptcy court order denying a bank’s motion to compel arbitration, holding that when a debtor seeks to enforce a discharge injunction, a bankruptcy court may decline to compel arbitration because it implicates a bankruptcy court’s ability to enforce its own orders.
A copy of the opinion in Henry v. Educational Financial Service is available at: Link to Opinion.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently affirmed in part and reversed in part a trial court’s judgment against a debtor who filed an adversary proceeding alleging that a creditor and its counsel violated the bankruptcy discharge by trying to collect a discharged debt, holding that the attorney could not be held in contempt because he lacked knowledge of the discharge, but the creditor could be held liable for the actions of its counsel under agency law.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently reversed a bankruptcy court’s ruling that a lender failed to perfect its security interest because its UCC financing statement failed to provide sufficient indication of the secured collateral under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently affirmed the bankruptcy court’s denial of a debtor-borrower’s motion for sanctions, which alleged that her mortgage loan servicer violated her bankruptcy discharge by mailing a communication in a purported attempt to collect upon a discharged debt.
In determining the legal standard for holding a creditor in civil contempt for attempting to collect a debt in violation of a bankruptcy discharge order, the Supreme Court of the United States adopted an “objectively reasonable” standard, and held that a court may hold a creditor in civil contempt if there is “no fair ground of doubt” as to whether the order barred the creditor’s conduct.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, which had applied a subjective standard for civil contempt.
A Big Answer To A Big Question. After dividing the courts for a number of years, we finally have the answer to the big question of whether rejection of a trademark license by a debtor-licensor deprives the licensee of the right to use the trademark. Here’s the question on which the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v Tempnology, LLC case:
The US Supreme Court decided what the International Trademark Association (INTA) called "the most significant unresolved legal issue in trademark licensing" when it ruled on May 20, 2019, that bankrupt companies cannot use bankruptcy law to revoke a trademark license.
In its 8-1 decision, the court resolved a circuit split by holding that a debtor's rejection of a trademark license under Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, which enables a debtor to "reject any executory contract" (a contract that neither party has finished performing), amounts only to a breach of the license.
In an agricultural lien contest between three creditors of a bankrupt commercial farm, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently affirmed the trial court’s award of summary judgment in favor of a bank that provided debtor-in-possession financing, holding that the locale of the farm products determined the applicable lien law and that bank’s lien was superior to the liens of two nurseries that supplied trees and shrubs because the latter were either unperfected or unenforceable.
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently affirmed a lower bankruptcy court’s ruling that a refinanced mortgage was enforceable as to the interests of both husband and wife, where the wife did not execute the note and was not defined as a “borrower” in the body of the mortgage, but nonetheless initialed and signed the mortgage document as a “borrower” in the signature block.
The Supreme Court of Missouri recently held that a trial court abused its discretion by certifying an overly broad class with a class representative whose claims against the debt collector defendant were not typical of the class.