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The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari on an issue that has greatly divided Circuit Courts of Appeal – the question of whether an entity that retains possession of a debtor’s property has an affirmative obligation to return that property to the debtor or trustee immediately upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition or risk being in violation of the automatic stay.

The famous and respected Beales department store chain has entered into administration, an insolvency procedure provided under the Insolvency Act.

It is always depressing when any company fails and is forced to enter into administration, let alone a prestigious business such as Beales with its 139-year-old history. The ripples of such an insolvency not only impact upon its 1300 employees, but it is also painfully felt amongst its suppliers, landlords and of course the greater community.

Retail, as a sector, has long been under pressure from increased competition from online retailers, which has resulted in reduced footfall on the high street, affecting many companies, including many well-known names.

Between 2016 and 2019, 13 of 23 company voluntary arrangements (CVAs), which are used by UK businesses to reduce their debts, saw their group going into administration, while other companies that did not agree a CVA ended up seeking investors to buy the business.

What is a CVA?

The Supreme Court, in Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC,1 issued an unanimous opinion last week, ruling that the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit correctly denied the ability of creditor Ritzen Group Inc.

The United States District Court for the District of Delaware recently affirmed a Delaware bankruptcy court case that held that the mutuality requirement of section 553(a)1The case declined to find mutuality in a triangular setoff between the debtor, a parent entity that owed the debtor money, and that entity’s subsidiary, which was a creditor.2

A recent bankruptcy court decision out of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California, In re Verity Health Sys. of Cal., Inc., Case No. 2:18-bk-20151 (ER) (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2019), is a good reminder of how difficult it is for a purchaser under an asset purchase agreement to get out of the deal by invoking a Material Adverse Effect clause (also known as a Material Adverse Change clause) (an “MAE”).

In a highly anticipated decision issued last Thursday (on December 19, 2019), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held in In re Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC that a bankruptcy court may constitutionally confirm a chapter 11 plan of reorganization that contains nonconsensual third-party releases. The court considered whether, pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011), Article III of the United States Constitution prohibits a bankruptcy court from granting such releases.

Before ingesting too much holiday cheer, we encourage you to consider a recent opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Weil Bankruptcy Blog connoisseurs will recall that, in May 2019, we wrote on the Southern District of New York’s decision in In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation, Case No. 12-2652, 2019 WL 1771786 (S.D.N.Y. April 23, 2019) (Cote, J.) (“Tribune I”).

A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has voided its previous near explicit declaration that make-whole provisions are always unmatured interest, and therefore subject to disallowance under section 502(b) of the Bankruptcy Code in Ultra Petroleum.